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In the 1990s, many municipalities developed local activation programs for 
social assistance recipients as a response to increasing social assistance 
expenditures. This study investigates the practical implementation of municipal 
activation policies in two different activation programs, Jobbcentrum in 
Skärholmen and Källan in Osby. The purpose with the study is to highlight 
how the front-line workers systematically translate activation policy into 
practice in their interactions with the clients. The study utilizes a street-level 
bureaucracy perspective, which illuminates the role of bureaucratic and 
professional discretion and how institutional factors shape the practical 
responses of front-line staff. Coping behaviors at the ground influences the 
practical work with activation requirements. The staff develop such coping 
strategies to manage working conditions marked by ambiguous legislation, 
organizational pressures, limited resources, and little responsibility for program 
accountability. Findings from this study suggest that the implementation 
practices in Skärholmen and Osby frequently diverge from formal intentions of 
activation policy and the programs’ own goals and descriptions of their work. 
 
Keywords:  Municipal activation policy, social assistance, street-level 
bureaucracy theory, front-line workers, implementation, Jobbcentrum, Källan.  
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1 Background 
During the 1990s many municipalities implemented activation programs for 
social assistance recipients in order to combat unemployment and rising social 
assistance expenditures. Municipal activation programs are today a regular 
component in the Swedish welfare system and there are around 800 municipal 
activation programs in Sweden. One of the rationales for these programs, much 
simplified, is that unemployed social assistance recipients essentially are 
“passive” while receiving social assistance. In order to end such passivity, they 
need a combination of enforcement and support to “activate” them, which will 
make them self-sufficient workers, and accordingly, lower the social assistance 
costs.  
The expansion of local activation programs has led to a decentralization of 
the Swedish labor market policy system with separate arrangements beside the 
governmental labor market policy system delivered by the Public Employment 
Services (Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004). Municipal activation programs are 
organized and administered locally and can range from mandatory work 
requirements to training and education with large variations in both quantity 
and quality between different municipalities. A labor market policy system 
based on local and discretionary translations of the formal legislation is 
difficult to standardize and the social assistance claimants are subject of front-
line workers individual discretion. Today, this discretion involves both the 
determination of entitlement to social assistance and the content of the 
activation requirement.  
These programs are both praised and criticized in the current welfare debate. 
Some scholars argue that this is the right way to social inclusion by improving 
their possibilities to enter the regular labor market. Other argues that municipal 
activation measures only are a new form of control and work enforcement for 
those dependent of social assistance. Our current knowledge about municipal 
activation programs is rather limited since little systematic research is 
conducted about municipal activation programs. To fill one gap in our 
understanding about activation, this study examines how municipal activation 
policy is implemented in two different municipalities. It attempts separate the 
formal legislation and official program rhetoric from the practical 
implementation of activation policies. It is important to note that activation 
measures are not viewed as something inherently positive or negative in this 
study, because we do not know if activation improves clients’ chances to find a  
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regular employment and escape social assistance dependency. The two research 
sites are Skärholmen city-council
1 and Osby municipality. Skärholmen has an 
activation program called Jobbcentrum and Osby has a program called Källan. 
 
1.1  Labor market policies in Sweden 
It is known that Sweden exhibits extensive governmental interventions 
designed to redirect production and maintain full employment through active 
labor market policies (ALMP). ALMP programs, which have been in operation 
in Sweden since the 1940s, focus on a general development of the labor market 
itself and an improvement of the work force (Olofsson, 1996). The ALMP 
system provides a number of various programs and activities, ranging from job 
matching, training and education, rehabilitation, income support as well as 
services and support to employers and vulnerable regions.
2 The “work-line” is 
an important element of the Swedish welfare system and emphasizes work 
requirements for unemployed individuals plus re-training and skills-
enhancement instead of passive income benefits alone. Another component of 
the ALMP system is the Public Employment Services (PES), which im-
plements many of the governmental labor market policy services and programs.  
All unemployed persons in Sweden are allowed to utilize the services at the 
PES, including social assistance recipients. In fact, one pre-requisite for social 
assistance is that unemployed social assistance recipients need to be registered 
at the PES. The development of municipal activation programs is a supplement 
to the governmental ALMP system. For this particular study, it is important to 
illuminate the relationship between the traditional ALMP system and municipal 
activation policy since they are operating side by side in the Swedish labor 
market policy landscape. One principal difference between the governmental 
system and the municipal system is the source of income for the participants; 
most participants in the governmental system have qualified for unemployment 
                                                      
1 Skärholmen city-council is part of Stockholm municipality (Stockholm City) but as a city-
council, Skärholmen has autonomy and independence in organizing both its social assistance 
system and activation program, similar to independent municipalities. Due to the above circum-
stances, I will use the term municipality and municipal activation program when discussing 
Skärholmen’s activation program. 
2 In 2002, an average of 116,600 people participated in various programs organized by AMS 
each month, which make up around 39 % of all unemployed and in the following year that 
number was reduced to 92,000 participants each month. In 2004 the number had increased to 
106,000 (National Labour Market Board, 2005).  
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insurance
3 while those receiving social assistance recipients are referred to the 
municipal social services for their income support. 
 
1.2  Municipal activation programs 
Despite the governmental ALMP system, municipalities started to develop their 
own activation programs for unemployed social assistance recipients during the 
recession in the 1990s (Svenska Kommunförbundet, 1998). This was a 
consequence of the high influx of unemployed individuals to the social 
assistance system. These individuals did not qualify for unemployment in-
surance or other governmental income schemes due to stricter entitlement rules 
and they were compelled to apply for social assistance (Salonen, 1997). 
Another reason was that many of those who must apply for social assistance 
was not viewed as “job ready” according to the PES and did not receive much 
support from the governmental programs. This is a fact that still is true for 
many social assistance recipients. The local dimension of municipal activation 
programs is one of the main features of this system. It is therefore difficult to 
illustrate the ‘typical’ organization of a municipal activation programs due to 
the vast variation between different municipalities and different programs. In a 
recent study, Salonen & Ulmestig (2004) projected that there was around 800 
activation programs with around 13,000 participants in 2002. This is equivalent 
with 30,000 people per year and 12 % of all social assistance recipients. The 
administrative cost per client and month in these programs could range from 
15,000 SEK to 1000 SEK, which illustrates a large financial variation as well. 
Salonen & Ulmestig argue that activation policy for social assistance recipients 
operates, as a “second rate” labor market policy for those who do not qualify 
for unemployment insurance. Municipal programs are often arranged on a 
project basis, which results in many different types of programs, large disparity 
and inconsistency in target groups, program goals, length of time in program, 
and program content. It is therefore important to discuss whether municipal 
activation programs signify a different type of labor market measure compared 
to traditional ALMP measures in Sweden. 
Municipal activation programs are regularly organized by the social service 
organizations and their social assistance administration. These municipal sys-
tems are characterized by high levels of municipal autonomy and marked with 
                                                      
3 Unemployed individuals can also be entitled other types of governmental income support such 
as cash assistance support (KAS) and activity support (Aktivitetsstöd) delivered by the PES.  
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significant bureaucratic and professional discretion. Front-line workers often 
perform eligibility determination, assigning individuals to work related 
activities, and monitoring clients’ compliance with high levels of discretion.  
 
1.3  Comparison between traditional ALMP and activation 
programs 
Traditional ALMP programs build, in general, on higher levels of voluntary 
participation and financial reimbursement, often through unemployment 
insurance. Some ALMP programs are not completely voluntary as there are 
firm requirements (e.g. in the Activity Guarantee) in order to receive 
unemployment insurance support or other types of governmental income 
support. But in comparison with many municipal activation programs the level 
and character of the compulsion is generally lower for ALMP programs 
(Salonen 2000). An additional consequence is that most ALMP programs have 
similar rules in the whole country while the municipal system has large 
disparities in how rules and regulations are applied. Yet another concern with 
the development of a municipal activation system is the lack of systematic 
follow-ups and evaluations of this type of programs. These programs can have 
more than 290 responsible authorities as they are arranged on municipal levels 
and it is therefore difficult to have standardized measures to control the results 
of the programs. The governmental ALMP system has more resources and 
routines to evaluate the results of their programs and keep track the 
participants, compared to the municipal systems. 
However, the local character of municipal activation programs can be 
something positive. Municipalities have a better knowledge about the local 
employment situation and more flexible in regards to local circumstances. But 
it is important to note that such claims must be understood in the light of 
citizenship. When citizens that live in similar situations, but in different 
geographic areas, receive very different support, due to local variation and 
workers’ discretion, it can weaken the right to equal legal treatment of the 
individuals. The large variation in activation programs does not only occur 
between municipalities, it is also common that different administrative areas 
within the same municipality arrange activation programs in different ways. 
The implementation of activation requirements can also vary between workers 
in the same organization since discretion at the front-worker level is significant. 
Hence, interpretations of what social assistance recipients should be required to 
do vary both between municipalities and front-line workers. It is problematic in  
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terms of equal citizenship as it reduces the legal security for the individuals 
(Rothstein, 1994). Such implementation problems can occur within the ALMP 
system as well, but with its stronger emphasis on local discretion it is more 
likely to become an issue in the municipal activation system. 
Below is a schematic comparison of the main principal differences between 
ALMP programs and municipal activation programs. Although, it is important 
to note that the differences in the two different systems are not definite as 
certain elements can be noticed in both systems. 
 
Table 1 Comparison between ALMP programs and municipal activation 
programs 




  The Swedish National Labour 
Market Administration 
  Public Employment Services 
  Local municipalities (290 
different responsible 
authorities) 




  More systematic evaluations 
and resources for follow-ups 
  Few systematic evaluations 
of outputs or follow-ups 
Participation 
principle 
  Lower levels of compulsory 
participation 
  Higher levels of 
compulsory participation 
Sanctions    Reduced or lost unemployment 
insurance or other forms of 
financial support (e.g. activity 
support) 
  Reduced or lost social 
assistance 
  Large variation in time 
before sanctions are 
enforced. 
Type of financial 
support 
  Rights-based support through 
unemployment insurance and 
other type of governmental 
income support 
  Needs- and means tested 
benefits (i.e. social 
assistance) 
 
1.4  Social assistance legislation and activation policy 
Municipal activation requirements are regulated in the Social Service Act (see 
Appendix A) and its policies about social assistance delivery.
4 During the last 
decades, the individual’s responsibility to become self-sufficient has been 
increasingly underlined in the legislation. Municipal activation requirement 
was legally sanctioned in 1998 when the Social Service Act was changed in 
order to make it possible to require participation in work related activities in 
                                                      
4 SFS 2001:453 The Social Service Act.  
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exchange for social assistance. The Supreme Administrative Court and the 
National Board of Health and Welfare has accentuated this development in the 
sense that they have insisted that unemployed social assistance recipients 
should participate in work related programs (Johansson, 2001).  
However, the right to demand activation requirements is not unconditional 
for the municipality. The Social Service Act has some general principles, 
including both rights and obligations, which should be considered in the social 
assistance administration. Municipalities shall not grant social assistance 
unconditionally and without requirements on the individual. All social 
assistance recipients shall be “doing what he or she can” in order to support for 
him or her self. Unemployed social assistance recipients are required to “be to 
the disposal to the labor market” and registered at the PES, which means that 
they should actively search for jobs and accept reasonable job offers. The 
obligations can involve participation in ALMP programs, work rehabilitation, 
public relief work, and language education for immigrants. Clients can also be 
required to participate in municipal job search activities.
5 Källan and 
Jobbcentrum can, from a legal perspective, be viewed as such activities. Clients 
below 25 years can be required to participate in work related programs for 
young people with the special aim of improving their possibilities to enter the 
regular labor market.
6  
According to the legislator, social assistance delivery and its related 
activation requirements are associated with a number of additional principles. 
These principles are that clients’ self-determination should be respected and 
that individual preferences should be taken into account when possible. The 
activation requirements should also be appropriate for each individual in terms 
of individual needs and whether it can improve the individual’s possibilities to 
enter the regular labor market. The legislator’s intention is that the municipality 
should collaborate with the local PES and other relevant authorities prior to 
referring a client to a municipal activation program. Municipalities are also 
allowed to reduce or withdraw the social assistance benefit in case of non-
compliance with the rules of being to disposal to the labor market and if clients 
refuse to participate in work related programs. Furthermore, the legislation 
formulates specific rules for young people and people with particular needs for 
work related support perform in a subsequent section in the Social Service 
                                                      
5 Proposition 1996/1997:124. 
6 Ses SFS 2000:453, Section 4, § 4.  
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Act.
7 These rules specify first, under what conditions they can be required, 
second, what type of requirements they need to perform, and third, what type of 
responsibilities the municipality needs to fulfill. The municipality has more 
responsibilities for young people toward in the sense that the activation 
requirement must follow an individual plan and has a stronger emphasis that 
the activity should be competence enhancing for the individual. How the 
municipalities are applying the different rules in the legislation is unclear and 
varies a lot between different municipalities (Socialstyrelsen, 2005). 
The Social Service Act generates a very complex and ambiguous situation 
regarding the intention and the meaning of municipal activation requirements. 
The legal situation is unclear for a number of reasons. First, few legal cases 
have, this far, clearly advised how the legislation should be interpreted in 
terms of the content of the activation requirement. Second, the fact that the 
Social Service Act is a “framework” law produces a vast array of 
interpretations of “who can be required” and what clients are “required to do”. 
On one hand, it is a possibility for municipalities to require clients to 
participate in both ALMP programs as well as municipal activation programs. 
On the other hand, such requirements should be in line with clients’ own 
preferences as well as improving the individual’s labor market opportunities. 
Third, the legislation is vague in terms of rights and obligations for both the 
individual and the municipality. Currently, the formal legislation open up for a 
situation in which the activation requirement can entail both “carrots” and 
“sticks” for both the clients and the front-line workers. 
These ambiguous conditions create a situation in which activation can take 
many possible shapes. For example, which clients are required? Under what 
circumstances are clients required? What do clients have to do? What support 
do they receive? Who determine what is skills-enhancing or not? What happen 
if clients fail to fulfill the activation requirement? These interpretations are for 
the moment left to the front-line workers discretionary practices. 
 
1.5  Prior research of activation policy 
The current relationship between the governmental labor market policy system 
and the municipal system is both complex and problematic. Scholars have 
previously indicated that the welfare system in Sweden rests on a dual 
                                                      
7 SFS 2000:453, Section 4, § 4 and § 5.  
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structure, where those with a stable relationship to the labor market experience 
high levels of social security in contrast to marginal segments of the population 
that enjoy much less social security (Marklund & Svallfors, 1987). Lødemel 
(1997) has also drawn attention to the fact that countries with well-developed 
ALMP programs and social insurance plans, also have very stigmatized and 
means-tested social assistance programs. Lødemel claims that high levels of 
surveillance characterize this type of social assistance programs and benefits 
are commonly conditioned on various forms of activation requirements. Under 
such conditions, activation policy constitutes an “offer you can’t refuse” 
according to Lødemel & Trickey (2000) and it is this type of implications that 
might show up in the practical administration of municipal activation 
programs.  
Activation has frequently been discussed in the international literature for 
the last couple of years (Andersen et al 2002; Giddens, 1998; Hvinden et al 
2001; Wright 2002) and has both proponents and opponents. Those critical 
towards activation requirements argues that activation is a shift from the right 
to voluntary participate in training and education toward a workfare model with 
work-tests and sanctions are used in case of failure (see van Berkel & 
Hornemann Møller, 2002 for a longer discussion). According to the critics, 
activation is a punitive program with limited prospects for clients’ to influence 
their participation and it is not disclosed whether activation provides real 
opportunities for a reattachment to the labor market (Handler, 2004; Hanesch & 
Baltzer, 2001). Activation is also viewed as either an enabling model or a 
coercive model and Salonen (2000) describes these two models as: 
 
“In the enabling version the targeted measures stimulate a bottom-
up perspective which gives the individual a voice and expands his 
or her civic potential. Individualization is regarded as a way to 
increase the individual’s self-determination and control over his 
or her own life (the concept of empowerment is also being 
increasingly used in the Swedish discussion). The coercive 
version is in contrast dominated by a top-down perspective in 
which the authorities and the political system determine the 
design of the measures. In this interpretation, the activated 
individual has extremely limited influences over his or her 
participation” (Salonen, 2000, p 5).  
 
The Swedish form of activation policy cannot be distilled to either an 
enabling or a coercive model as it has attributes of both. For example, the  
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policy’s enabling features lie in the assessments of individual needs and the 
focus on clients’ skills-enhancement. Its involuntary aspects with attendance 
requirements in order to receive social assistance and close monitoring 
exemplify coercive elements. In reality it is up to each municipality to create 
programs that consist of enabling elements, coercive elements or both.  
In Sweden, only a handful of studies have examined the recent municipal 
activation development. The major findings from these studies are the 
following; individuals with weak ties to the labor market are often enforced to 
the social assistance system in case of unemployment (Salonen, 2000). There 
has been a shift in the interpretation of individuals’ rights to social assistance 
between the 1980s and the 1990s with greater emphasis on the individuals’ 
own responsibility and increased activation requirements (Johansson, 2001). 
Salonen & Ulmestig (2004) finds that the new forms of activation programs 
contain several differences in the legal rights for participants in municipal 
activation program compared to participants in traditional active labor market 
programs at the PES. They also demonstrate that social assistance recipients are 
treated very dissimilar in different municipalities due to the variance in local 
practices. Hedblom (2004) finds that program contents and client experiences 
depend on the local administrative context. She concludes that activation 
measures can both include clients to the regular labor market as well as 
marginalize them from the mainstream society due to different implementation 
practices and differentiation strategies.  
Whether activation programs are effective in terms of increased work 
participation or higher income is still unclear. Giertz (2004) finds only modest 
effects employment and income for long-term social assistance recipients while 
examining activation programs in Malmö. Hallsten et al (2002) find that there 
was no difference in employment rates between the control group and the study 
group after the completion of an activation program in Rinkeby city-council in 
Stockholm. In a new study, Ekström (2005) has recently examined 
“Skärholmsmodellen” in which Jobbcentrum is the main component. She 
argues that Jobbcentrum does not consist of any new working methods as it has 
many similarities with established models for the work with unemployed social 
assistance recipients (e.g. the Hallstahammar model and the Uppsala model).
8 
                                                      
8 The Uppsala model was introduced in the late 1980s by Eileen Rönnlund (1992). The model is 
characterized by strict work requirements for social assistance recipients and that the social 
workers should not make any decisions without a “night’s sleep” and discussion with colleagues. 
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The author also highlights that Jobbcentrum’s official objectives does not 
always correspond with the staffs’ statements about the program or how 
clients’ experience the program. Ekström concludes that the model is rather 
ambiguous in relation to the Social Service Act’s directions and intentions. 
These prior studies have provided valuable knowledge about activation 
requirements but supplementary studies are necessary in order to better 
understand this policy field. Hence, we do not know enough in order to declare 
if such programs are beneficial or not for its target populations. And especially, 
what type of activation practices is created and why they take that particular 
shape. 
 
1.6  The research question and scope of study 
In contrast to previous research approaches, this study investigates how 
activation policy is practiced via a study of the day-to-day implementation 
practices of two municipal activation programs. The study examines how acti-
vation policy is “produced” through the informal bureaucratic routines at the 
street-level. The main research questions are:  
 
  How are municipal activation programs organized and implemented within 
two municipal social services organizations?  
  How do the organizational contexts influence the practical implementation 
of municipal activation policy?  
  What does the implementation of municipal activations programs consist of 
in practice? 
 
The study examines the front-line practices in two different municipal social 
service organizations and their activation programs and utilizes an 
ethnographic approach to clarify what is distinctive about the front-line 
practices of activation programs. The official rhetoric and the general debate 
about increased activation requirements claims that activation measures assist 
social assistance recipients with individual support and skills-enhancing 
                                                                                                                                 
Many municipalities claim today that they are using modified forms of the model in their social 
assistance administration. The Hallstahammar model was introduced in the early 1980s and 
involved that unemployed social assistance recipients received a small additional amount of 
money (”stimulansbidrag”) if they performed work or a work related activity. See Bergmark & 
Lundström, 2000 for a discussion about different working models within the Swedish social 
services.  
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activities that will improve their economic situation through employment, that 
ultimately will help them to escape dependency and social exclusion. This 
study highlights how frontline workers translate such claims into practice and 
how the organizational contexts influence the practices on the ground. 
It is also important to describe the limitations of the study and what the 
study does not accomplish. The study does not examine the results of activation 
programs, which mean that it does not measure whether the clients find 
employment or if they are self-sufficient after leaving the programs. The study 
does not offer any results about clients’ income levels after the completion of 
programs or whether they have improved their financial situation. The study 
does not examine whether the two activation programs are conducting 
successful activation services in terms of reducing clients’ social assistance 
dependency. The focus is on the front-line workers’ practices and the clients 
are not in the spotlight for this study. However, clients’ responses will 
occasionally be used as a method to crosscheck observational information 
about the front-line workers’ behaviors. Consequently, it is not a regular 
evaluation of the programs and the study does not attempt to evaluate neither 
activation policy nor specific activation programs. Since the study is limited to 
a case study of two municipalities, it is inadequate to generalize about all 
municipal activation programs in Sweden but it offers detailed examples of the 




2  Street-level bureaucracy theory 
It is frequently noted that formal policy often bears little resemblance with 
practice (Elmore, 1978, 1979-80; Palumbo & Calista, 1990). Scholars have 
highlighted the importance of the street-level organization when implementing 
political decisions and that organizations not are neutral and unbiased in this 
process. In fact, Rothstein (2001) writes that the organization regularly 
influences the implementation process in the sense that it is the organization 
that determines the practical experience of a policy. It is common to focus on 
the implementation problem, which means that political decisions never are 
implemented as intended, and implementation is often viewed as the process in 
                                                      
9 Both programs have received a lot of attention, both from mass media but also from other 
municipal social services that are interested in developing similar methods.  
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which the political decisions fall short (Rothstein, 2001; Sannerstedt, 2001). 
Sannerstedt (2001) describes the implementation problem as normal aspects on 
political decision-making due to the diverse responsibilities for politicians and 
front-line workers, in addition to, conflicting opinions in the public debate, as 
well as the difficulty to control and monitor complex organizations.  
The role of implementation in the policy process has been further developed 
in Lipsky’s (1980) influential work on street-level bureaucracy. Lipsky 
develops the key notion that front-line workers constitute the link between the 
government and the citizens in their direct encounters with clients and refers to 
them as street-level bureaucrats.
10 Lipsky suggests that street-level bureaucrats 
encounter certain institutional conditions—for example, a greater demand for 
services than can be met with existing resources, huge caseloads, formal 
policies and legislation that are ambiguous or contradictory—which prompt 
them to develop coping behaviors that allow them to contend with the 
constraints and challenges in their work environment. Discretion is necessary 
for several reasons, but street-level bureaucrats’ use of discretion in this type of 
jobs means that policy is actually made by the front-line workers.  
Street-level bureaucrats develop coping mechanisms to manage their daily 
work. For example, they develop practices that limit demand, maximize the 
utilization of recourses, and obtain client compliance. They modify their 
concept of their job and the clients in order to narrow the gap between available 
recourses and assigned objectives. They ration services, utilize creaming (the 
selecting of clients who seem most likely to succeed), categorize and 
standardize clients to “fit” services instead of assessing individual needs, and 
limiting information about services to which clients are ostensibly entitled. 
They rationalize or provide ad hoc explanations about their decisions 
afterwards in order to justify their practical responses.  
Thus, street-level bureaucracy theory casts front-line workers as important 
agents in the policy-making process and seeks to explain their behavior by 
pointing to the role of organizational structures. Lipsky does briefly note that 
“… [organizations] are embedded in a larger system that creates and fortifies 
working conditions” (Lipsky, 1980, p 180), but he does not systematically 
relate organizational structures, and their implications for street-level practice, 
to political processes. A subsequent generation of implementation researchers 
                                                      
10 Lipsky defines street-level bureaucrats as public workers that have face-to-face encounters 
with clients in their work, e.g. social workers, policemen, teachers, doctors, and nurses.  
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(Brodkin, 1997; Morgen, 2001; Meyers at al, 1998; Lin, 2000; Schierenbeck, 
2003a) has addressed this limitation, seeking to understand street-level practice 
as an extension of political processes and goals and not only as an 
organizational experience. The development of street-level bureaucracy theory 
highlights how politics affects street-level practices via its implications for the 
contours of formal policy and the organizational entities charged with 
interpreting such policy mandates (Brodkin, 1986; 1987–88; 1990; 2000).  
This study directs the analytical attention to the interrelationship between 
the institutional context and the implementation processes, in particular how 
front-line workers’ use of discretion and coping strategies affect the practical 
experience of activation. Hence, the study attempts to demonstrate how the 
front-line workers in Skärholmen and Osby manage their specific political and 
organizational contexts while practically implementing the activation 
requirements. By applying a street-level bureaucracy perspective on the 
analysis I will be able to perceive how activation policy is articulated and re-
interpreted in practice provide insights about “what is activation policy’s 
practical meaning” and “why does street-level practice take its particular 
shape” (Brodkin, 2000, p 5).  
 
2.1  The analytic model of the implementation practices  
The analytic model assists to examine how the front-line staff develops coping 
behaviors, which ultimately add up to the organization’s interpretation and 
implementation of activation policy at the street-level. See figure 1. 
 










Figure 1 Analytic model of how the institutional context and front-line workers’ 
coping behaviors affect the implementation practices. 
Institutional context: 
•  Legislation 
•  General political goals 
•  Local political goals 
•  Organizational goals 




•  Sorting 
•  Categorizing 
•  Rationing 
•  Controlling 
•  Creaming 
•  Rationalizing 
Implementation 
practices: 
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  How front-line workers ration services and prioritize among clients when 
resources and time are limited. 
  How front-line workers cream among clients to select those who are most 
likely to succeed in the activation process. 
  How front-line workers categorize clients in order to match them to 
available services instead of assessing clients’ individual needs and 
preferences. 
  How front-line workers limit information about services and support to 
which clients are ostensibly entitled, when it is difficult for staff to provide 
adequate support. 
  How front-line workers rationalize and provide ad hoc explanations about 
their decisions in order to justify their decisions. 
  How front-line workers control and monitor clients and use sanctions to 
obtain clients’ compliance or check clients’ motivation to become self-
supporting. 
  How front-line workers disclaim accountability and separate the 
responsibility of formal decisions. 
 
The above examples of informal bureaucratic practices will be used to 
illustrate and analyze the practical character of municipal activation policy and 
how the municipalities respond to activation policy on the ground.  
 
2.2  Study design and research method 
The study is an observational case study with the focus on the organizational 
context (see Schwartzman, 1993 for organizational ethnography) in order to 
obtain thorough insights regarding the every-day practices in two local social 
assistance and activation organizations. A case study design is useful when the 
goal is to achieve a detailed and complex understanding while investigating a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, utilizing multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin, 1994). The case study approach is also beneficial 
when the study is exploratory and when prior knowledge is relatively limited 
(ibid). Then, it is more relevant to collect lots of information from few cases 
rather than the opposite. As activation policy is a rather new and unexplored 
field in the Swedish labor market policy landscape, and this study wants to 
understand the theoretical aspects the implementation process, a case study 
approach is suitable (see Esiasson at al, 2004, chapter 7).  
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The rationale for selecting more than one setting is to increases the study’s 
external validity by examining multiple organizations that are located and 
structured differently (Huberman & Miles, 2000). The comparative case study 
strategy do not allow generalizations about municipal activation programs in 
general, but permit an analysis to distinguish unique aspects from systemic 
aspects of the organizational practice and to consider specific differences in the 
particular local context. The studied municipalities are chosen through 
purposeful sampling (Creswell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994) where the 
field sites have been selected due to their articulated engagement in municipal 
activation policy. They have utilized the legal opportunity to create activation 
requirements for their unemployed social assistance recipients and almost all 
unemployed social assistance clients are mandated to attend an activation 
projects in these municipalities. These activation programs do not represent an 
average activation program in Sweden, but the selection is justifiable in order 
to be able to observe activation-in-practice.  
Furthermore, both municipalities have received public attention in mass 
media as well as amongst other municipalities and are often viewed as 
‘prototypical’ activation models. Other municipalities and organizations have 
visited them; they have figured in a number of newspaper articles and appeared 
in TV and radio programs. Managers for the programs in these municipalities 
are often invited as speakers at conferences. Additionally, these programs are 
often used a “good examples” by politicians, which make them principally 
interesting and valuable to scrutinize. Other municipalities have tried to 
replicate their activation approaches only with superficial knowledge from 
study visits, conference presentations, and anecdotal stories regarding the 
unknown relationships between reduced social assistance expenditures and the 
activation program.  
Creswell (1998) suggests that it is useful to select cases that differ in certain 
conditions in order to confirm or disconfirm certain results. The two field sites 
differ in organization, size, administrative structure and capacity, client demo-
graphics, local economic conditions, and local political orientation. For ex-
ample, one field site is located in an urban setting and has a heterogeneous 
demography with large numbers with immigrants whereas the other field site is 
smaller, located in a small town, and has a more homogenous demography and 
less unemployment.  
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2.3 Direct  observation 
The data collection consists of direct observations of front-line workers in both 
the social assistance administrations and the activation programs. Direct 
observation provides a method for understanding how people behave and 
operate within a specific and natural context (see Billquist, 1999 for an 
observation study). The documentation of front-line workers’ interactions, 
practices, and attitudes help to uncover behaviors that are unlikely to be 
recounted in formal interviews (Burawoy, 1991). Observations are particularly 
suitable when the goal is to examine processes or structures that are difficult to 
explain (Esiasson at al, 2004). I have observed the daily routines of the 
interaction between front-line workers and clients, the interactions between 
colleagues, and other regular administrative practices. In addition to the 
observations, interviews have been conducted with social workers, “activation 
workers”, managers, and local politicians. Interviews, semi-structured and 
open-ended, and conversations with front-line workers have occurred multiple 
times in order to check the interpretation of the observations and to clarify the 
daily practices. I have also observed staff meetings, social service board 
meetings and various other activities related to the social service and the 
activation programs. 
The fieldwork took place between August 2002 to June 2003 and more than 
400 hours of observations have been made and involves observations of 
approximately 90 client meetings. I have observed client meetings as they have 
occurred during a regular working day without manipulating the content or the 
order of the meetings. I have followed the daily work within the social 
assistance administration in the two municipalities, by following social 
workers’ and other staff members’ daily work. Around 50 staff members on 
various organizational and hierarchical levels have been observed. I have 
conducted interviews and informal conversations with the majority of the staff. 
I have observed staff meetings, administrative meetings, supervision, plus 
participated in informal discussion and conversations in hallways and in 
lunchrooms.  
I have tried to make my participation as little intrusive as possible and I 
have never been active in the client meetings. During client meetings, I have 
been sitting in the background taking notes when observing the interaction 
between the front-line worker and the client. The clients and the staff were 
always given an opportunity to decline my attendance but I received only a 
handful of rejections during the fieldwork. My participation might have  
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influenced the work and the behavior of the front-line workers and the clients 
but since I was part of each organization for a considerable amount of time, I 
argue that my participation became a rather natural element. Therefore, I 
believe that my presence did not influence workers’ or clients’ behavior 
significantly.  
 
2.4 Data  analysis 
In this type of qualitative analysis, control of validity involves a control of the 
empirical support for the findings and whether a sound interpretation of the 
data has been made. This has been done as an on-going procedure throughout 
the research process. For example, I have spent significant amount of time and 
followed the front-line work closely and repeatedly in order to secure my 
findings (Merriam, 1994). Using multiple data sources, like multiple 
observations in different settings, by basing the study in theory, and by 
systemize data collection and data analysis, can minimize the risk for ”observer 
bias” (Creswell, 1998; Esiasson at al, 2004). Therefore, observations are 
supplemented with interviews and informal conversations in order to check my 
observations and interpretations. The research is also complemented with 
analysis of written documents such as legislation, manuals, memos, directives, 
and case reviews. This means that I have used a strategy of combing a number 
of information sources and that allows us to crosscheck alternative explanations 
and the accuracy of the collected information and my interpretations. This form 
of triangulation of data in qualitative methods has helped to validate the 
findings (Creswell, 1998; Esiasson at al, 2004).  
During observations and informal conversations detailed filed notes have 
been taken to make “thick descriptions” of the studied situations (Silverman, 
2001). The field notes have been organized in a systematic way with the 
following information: time, place and who are participating. The activities 
have also been sorted into a number of main categories: client meetings, staff 
meetings, conversations or interviews with social worker/activation worker 
/program manager/client, morning meetings, political meetings etc. I have 
transcribed the hand written field notes after each day of the observations. 
Interviews have also been documented through hand written notes, which have 
been transcribed and categorized afterwards. I have linked the ‘content’ in the 
observations and interviews to theoretically defined concepts, by the street-
level bureaucracy theory, and highlighted them in the transcribed field notes.  
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Field notes have been analyzed, by repeated and careful reading, to 
elucidate patterns and to separate the systematic from the idiosyncratic in the 
observed street-level practices. The focus in the data analysis has been on how 
front-line workers are utilizing their discretion in their interactions with clients 
to detect systematic patterns of coping behaviors. These coping behaviors, in 
aggregated form, add up to what activation means in practice. In case studies, 
conducted over time, certain behaviors and situations will reoccur multiple 
times and it is these repetitions that constitute the systematic patterns, which 
exemplifies activation-in-practice. The presentation of the research is based on 
excerpts from field notes and interviews and they are presented as authentic as 
possible, but not as direct citations. The excerpts from the observations are 
used as empirical examples of the typical and systematic elements of the 
practical work of activation (i.e. want front-line workers regularly are doing 
when interacting with clients). I have also used examples from conversations 
and interviews in order to demonstrate how the staff view or describe their 
actions. Although, I have selected the parts of the field notes that demonstrates 
the most common responses and behaviors in order to make the text more 
readable. In some cases, the excerpts demonstrate an exceptional or 
idiosyncratic situation to highlight what is uncommon in the practical work of 
activation. When such examples are used it will be described in the text. 
 
 
3  Description of the local activation 
programs 
Jobbcentrum and Källan are closely linked to the municipalities’ social 
assistance system. In both organizations, social workers make the formal 
assessments whether clients are entitled to social assistance and determine the 
amounts of the support. Hence, social workers perform the exercise of public 
authority.
11 It is also the social workers that refer the clients to the activation 
programs and determine what should be required of the clients. Other staff 
categories are responsible for the work related activities in the activation 
program. The social workers and the activation workers have regular contact 
with each other to follow up the clients’ compliance and results at the act-
                                                      
11 “Myndighetsutövning” in Swedish (my translation).  
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ivation program. The right to social assistance is based on the clients’ 
participation and performance at the activation program. 
In Skärholmen and Osby, most social assistance clients are referred to the 
activation programs when unemployed or in part-time work. In general, it is the 
social worker that decides what type of activity the client should be doing at the 
activation program. Jobbcentrum and Källan are non-voluntary programs in the 
sense that clients are required to participate in order to receive financial 
support. The entitlement to social assistance is therefore linked to their 
participation in the activation programs. Clients are consequently mandated to 
participate until they find employment or decline social assistance support. The 
financial reimbursement for participating in activation programs is the same as 
the client’s social assistance benefit and participation does not provide 
additional income or an automatic inclusion in governmental unemployment 
insurance. Sanctions in form of reductions or a total loss of the cash assistance 
can be made in case clients fail to fulfill the activation requirement.  
The primary activities at Jobbcentrum and Källan are independent job 
search in which clients search for vacancies through newspapers, billboard ads, 
and the Internet. Clients are at various stages in their job search process and the 
staff process both new clients and clients that have been in the programs for 
extended periods of time. Clients can be offered, when available, practical 
training and short-term courses. Källan offers Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) 
and Jobbcentrum offers some basic language training for a small selection of 
clients. Many in the staff do not have a formal education or training in 
employment service or experience from other job-related services and only a 
handful of the staff is trained social workers. A number of the staff at both 
programs have recently experienced unemployment themselves and have 
received different kinds of employment support. According to Jobbcentrum’s 
program manager, as many as 70 % of the staff has been unemployed prior to 
their work at Jobbcentrum.
12  
 
3.1  Jobbcentrum: program description 
Jobbcentrum opened in 1998 with the focus on intense job search for 
unemployed social assistance recipients. It started as a small-scale local 
program for young people, but has grown to include social assistance clients of 
                                                      
12 Interview with program manager 2003-06-16  
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all ages. Jobbcentrum is today a permanent part of Skärholmen’s social 
assistance administration. It collaborates with three other city-councils; 
Hägersten, Älvsjö, and Liljeholmen plus the local Public Employment Services 
and the Social Security Offices, in the sense that they purchase slots at 
Jobbcentrum and send their clients to the program.  
The social assistance administration has a director, who is the overall 
manager for both the social workers and Jobbcentrum’s staff. Jobbcentrum has 
also a program manager who is in charge for the programs’ daily operations. 
Jobbcentrum has around 25 staff members, most of the are called “job coaches” 
and the on-going caseload is approximately 1000 clients with as many as 200–
250 clients attending Jobbcentrum every day.
13 The client group range from 
18–65 years and both men and women attend the program. Many participants 
are immigrants and language barriers are common. The social assistance 
organization has 12 social workers plus 11–12 administrative assistants.  
New social assistance applicants, whom are unemployed, are directly 
referred to Jobbcentrum by an in-take group without an initial meeting with a 
social worker and ongoing cases can be referred at any time when the social 
worker assess that the client should be activated. Initially at Jobbcentrum, 
clients undergo an assessment of the clients’ employment situation and how 
Jobbcentrum can assist the clients’ advancement into the labor market. Indi-
vidual job search is what most clients are involved in at Jobbcentrum. There are 
around 10 computers with Internet access that clients can reserve for 15 
minutes each time. The waiting time is significant and clients seldom use the 
computers for more than one time slot each day. Clients have also access to 10 
additional workstations on which they can write applications and resumes. 
When clients ask for help, the staff assists clients with applications and 
resumes. The program have contacts with employers, recruiting companies, and 
training programs, to which some clients are matched toward, when it is 
possible or slots are available.  
                                                      
13 Many clients are on sick leave, on practical training or just disappeared but are still registered 
at Jobbcentrum.   
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According to program documents, the main goal for Jobbcentrum is to 
support social assistance recipients to enter the labor market or to an education 
that will improve their possibilities to become self-supportive. It is a program 
where different authorities and organizations shall encourage participants’ 
individual development and a place where they can find support for their 
individual aim in life and to help them to an independent life. The program 
claim in the 2003 annual report that their main objectives are: 
 
  All unemployed social assistance recipients in Skärholmen shall be offered a job or 
another work-related activity within 5 days. 
  Provide clients with support that will improve their personal power. 
  Give all clients at Jobbcentrum a respectful treatment. 
  Help the clients to find strategies to increase their healthy attendance in the society 
and the work place. 
  Give the clients the help they are asking for.
15 
 
Other goals is to reduce social assistance dependency and increase the 
employment rates and the program is defined as a method that breaks the 
vicious cycle of hopelessness, obstruct “black-market jobs” (i.e. jobs on the 
informal labor market), reduce social isolation, and decrease deteriorating 
mental and physical health. In other program documents, it is also stated that 
Jobbcentrum has a “solution focused” working method in which the clients’ 
own ideas and solutions are important. Jobbcentrum’s aim according to official 
                                                      
14 The referral process illustrates the process for new clients and not on-going cases that already 
have a contact with a social worker. 
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statements is that it should allow for flexible solutions based on individual 
assessments. There is also a strong focus on clients’ self-determination and 
individual resources. Margareta Johansson, the political chairman in 
Skärholmen city-council, is convinced that Jobbcentrum is a very positive 
element for social assistance recipients and that clients should do something in 
return for social assistance. At the same time, she emphasizes both the 
individual focus at Jobbcentrum and that some clients cannot work for various 
reasons and that they must be exempted from the requirement. She contends 
that the social workers must do individual assessments: 
 




But Margareta Johansson points also to the fact that the social workers have 
a difficult work situation that affects their practical responses: 
 
It is important, how we, as politicians, can support the social 
workers as they are working under enormous pressures with high 
caseloads and that they must satisfy a number of different goals 
simultaneously, it’s the clients’ the managers’ and the politicians’ 




This speaks to the fact that the front-line workers in Skärholmen works 
under demanding conditions, which ultimately will affect both their time and 
their interactions with clients. But despite such organizational traits, the formal 
goal, as described, both in program documents and by the local political leader 
is that Jobbcentrum is a place where clients should be given individual support 
to grow as individuals and improve their chances to enter the regular labor 
market. 
 
3.2  Källan: program description  
Källan is the activation program in Osby municipality. Around 5–10 social 
assistance clients participate in the program each day. 10–20 immigrant clients 
that are referred from the social assistance office to study SFI and participate in 
work related activities. Unemployed social assistance recipients are required to 
                                                      
16 Interview with Margareta Johansson political chairman in Skärholmen, 2003-04-08 
17 Interview with Margareta Johansson political chairman in Skärholmen, 2003-04-08  
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attend Källan 48 hours after their social assistance application has been 
approved. Källan collaborates with the PES and the Social Security Offices in 
Osby. It has also contact with schools and employers in the area. In addition to 
job search, clients can be involved in internal job-training activities, such as 
carpentry, kitchen work, and cleaning, the computer lab (i.e. “Datortek”, which 
is a PES program) and a rehabilitation program. Most immigrant clients 
participate in SFI, and in contrast to Jobbcentrum, clients are encouraged to 
complete language courses. All clients are allowed to participate in courses and 
practical placements provided by the PES and get the financial reimbursement 
from the PES when possible.  
Occasionally, Källan provides practical training with local employers. 
Källan had an ambitious plan to build a bank of practical training slots with 
companies in the local area but this idea was not very successful. It was 
difficult to find employers that were interested in Källan’s clients. The 
availability of practical training was also very dependent on the general 
employment situation in the area. When the unemployment rate was low, 
employers made such slots available, but when the unemployment rate 
increased and it became difficult for Källan to regularly provide practical 
training for their clients. In addition to the work related activities, Källan 
provides, “personal development courses” including presentation techniques, 
interview skills, and self-assessments. They also help clients with their job 
applications and resumes. A handful of people are working at Källan and the 
social assistance administration is also small with only four social workers. The 
social assistance director is the head for both the social assistance organization 































are made (e.g. 
at the morning 
meeting)
Begin at Källan 
within 48 hours 
after the social 
assistance 
decision  
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In program documents it is stated that the goal with Källan’s activities is 
that “as many participants as possible shall be self-supportive” and that the 
program shall provide the clients with different forms of individual competence 
development.
18 Ingmar Berntsson was the political leader in the social welfare 
committee in Osby when Källan was initiated and he explains: 
 
During the 1990s, there were high costs for the elderly and for 
social assistance. And we frankly said, “the social assistance costs 
must be reduced to 10 million” and it was then Källan was 
created. Källan has given the social workers an instrument to 
work with and I believe that Källan is the reason why Osby has 
reduced the social assistance costs … But it is not only Källan as 
structural factors are important too. It’s Källan combined with the 
[Uppsala] model, which means that one should mobilize clients’ 
own recourses. I think that this method is in line with social work 
treatment methods as it focuses on the client. 
 
It must be meaningful for the individual to go to an activity like 
Källan but it’s also important to show them that life is not always 
happy and joyful. It shall not be fun all the time but it’s important 
that they also focus on improving the clients’ self-esteem.
19 
 
In Osby, the general political vision is that the work-line is important and 
that Källan together with the Uppsala model make up a working model that 
focus on clients’ individual needs in addition to activation requirements. The 
official idea is that social assistance clients are in need for both rights and 
requirements in order to become self-sufficient. But the clients’ own resources 
should be taken into account when determining the support. 
 
3.3 Program  statistics 
Neither Skärholmen nor Osby has systematically evaluated their activation 
program in terms of program outputs and there is no knowledge whether the 
clients find jobs as a result of the programs. Both municipalities are measuring 
their “results” by correlating the program’s “result” to the reduction in social 
assistance caseloads on the municipal level. Such correlations are rather 
complex and the interpretation is unclear since most municipalities, with or 
without activation programs, have reduced their caseloads during the last 
                                                      
18 From Källan’s Annual Plan 2002. 
19 Interview with Ingmar Berntsson, politician in Osby, 2003-04-29  
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years.
20 According to Ekström (2005) the social assistance reduction in 
Skärholmen between 1998 and 2003 is not remarkable when comparing with 
similar city-councils in Stockholm City.
21  
A systematic examination of the programs’ results is nearly impossible due 
to the lack of program data that would allow such analysis. In lieu of 
systematic program data, sources like annual reports, internal program and in-
formation has been utilized in order to find information of programmatic out-




3.3.1  Jobbcentrum in figures 
Between the start in September 1998 to May 2003, Jobbcentrum has served 
over 2,900
23 individuals according to the attendance registration data. The 
influx of new clients varies between 20 and 120 clients per month, suggesting 
that the flow of clients is very inconsistent. The table below indicates the 
number of clients starting in the program for each year.
24  
 









                                                      
20 Social assistance caseloads and expenditures are currently increasing in Sweden. 
21 For example, when comparing with Kista, a city-council similar to Skärholmen in terms of 
size, demographic situation, and unemployment rates, but without a program like Jobbcentrum, 
between 1998 and 2003 the reduction of social assistance clients was 50.6 % in Kista and 47.4 % 
in Skärholmen, reduction of social assistance clients in regards to population was 53.5 %in Kista 
and 49 % in Skärholmen, and reduction in social assistance household was 49.1 % in Kista and 
41.8 %in Skärholmen (Statistics Stockholm 2004). 
22 It is impossible examine of the quality of the data (e.g. if all clients are incorporated in the 
data, correct coding or the conditions of the information). But despite the limitation in this type 
of program data, it is still interesting to analyze clients’ program times based on this data 
23 This number includes social assistance clients from other city-councils as well as participants 
referred from the Public Employment Services.  
24 2003 is excluded since observation ends in May 2003. 






Sum 2,944  
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Most clients attend Jobbcentrum for one period, but a number of clients attend 
Jobbcentrum between two and four times. See table 3 below.  
 
Table 3 Number of times in the program  
 
Number of times  Number of clients 
de-registered 
Number of clients 
still in program 
1 2,090  377 
2 226  137 
3 38  36 
4 0  2 
Total 2,354  552 
 
In general, it was 15 % of the clients who participates in the program for more 
than one period. But interestingly, in May 2003 as many as 32 % (175 of 552) 
has been at Jobbcentrum more than once. The data does not tell why the clients 
in May 2003 had been registered at Jobbcentrum several times. On average, 
clients stay for 258 days (median 162) in the program, but it is to some extent 
dependent on starting year.
25 It suggests that program duration correlates with 
the general employment situation, as the unemployment rate was lower in the 
early 2000s when program duration was shorter. See table below 4 for program 
duration. 
 
Table 4 Program duration after starting year at Jobbcentrum 
 





Percent of clients still 
in program 
(Censored) 






















                                                      
25 Analysis made with a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis.  
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Note: Analysis made with a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis. Year 2003 is excluded since the 
observation window ends in May 2003. 19.4 % of the clients from 2002 and 71.6 % of the clients 
from 2003 are still participating in the program. 
 
The attendance data also provide information about different exit factors 
and how the exit is related to program duration. See table 5 below.  
 
Table 5 Exit factors from Jobbcentrum 1998–2003  
 





in days (Mean) 
Work 
ALMP Measures 
Activity and Youth Guarantee 

































Sum 2,895  100   
 
It is clear that the exit factor “work” has shortest program durations (186 
days), but it is only for 511 clients that “work” has been known as the reason 
for the program exit. For as many as 1,613 clients the exit factor was “de-
registered”, which does not entail information about the client’s situation after 
leaving the program. This means that it is rather uncertain what clients are 
doing after attending Jobbcentrum. Are they still receiving social assistance, do 
they have a job, or have they moved to another municipality? In sum, we know 
that the average program duration was 8,5 months and that most clients (around 
85 %) attended Jobbcentrum one time. Finding a job is the fastest way to leave 
the program, but this is only certain for 18 % of the clients. The majority of 
clients leave Jobbcentrum without information about the reason for the exit. 
 
3.3.2  Källan in figures 
Källan do not have attendance data equivalent to Jobbcentrum and an analysis 
compared to the above is impossible. But Källan has some internal program 
statistics, which has been used for a brief statistical analysis of the program.
26 
                                                      
26 Statistical information for Källan is provided by Tony Perssson, program manager.  
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Between 1998 and June 2004, Källan has served approximately 222 clients, 
who have started 307 times in the program. It is regularly only a small share, 6 
to 10 individuals, of social assistance clients at Källan. Immigrant clients are a 
large group and between January 2002 and July 2004, 15 to 30 immigrant 
clients attended Källan each day on average. The majority of the clients at 
Källan are coming from the PES and the social Security Office. In the program 
component called “Activation”
27, which is the most common activity for social 
assistance clients, between January 2002 and July 2004, 88 individuals started 
108 times in the program. 
Källan has much shorter program durations compared to Jobbcentrum, as 
clients stayed in the program for 49 days on average. The maximum number of 
days varied between 350 and 153 days during the last six years. However, as 
most of Källan’s clients are referred from the PES or the Social Security Office 
they have often a different situation compared to the social assistance clients. 
For a detailed description of program durations, see table 6 below.   
 
Table 6 Program duration by starting year at Källan 
 
Year  Number of Days 
(Mean) 
Number of Days 
(Max) 
Number of days 
(Min) 
1998 55  350  4 
1999 76  350  2 
2000 37  259  1 
2001 (7 months)  30  60  2 
2002 49  153  1 
2003 51  156  4 
 
Clients at Källan attend the program, in general, only one time. 72 % of the 
clients had one program start, 20% has two program starts, and 8 % of the 
clients started three times or more. 
Källan’s program data indicate that the exit factor “work” has fluctuated 
between 10 % in 1998, up to 37 % in 2002, and down to 11 % in 2004,   
suggesting that clients’ ability to find employment after Källan is much 
dependent on the employment situation as the variation follows the general 
                                                      
27 “Sysselsättning” in Swedish (my translation).  
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unemployment rates. Another significant exit factor is “absenteeism” 
(unaccepted non-attendance or failure to comply with program rules), which 
has varied between 10 % and 24 % since 1998. This means that a number of 
clients must leave the program due to an inability to fulfill the activation 
requirement. See table 7 below. 
 
Table 7 Exit factors from Källan between 1998–2004  
 
Exit factor  Number of clients  
(%) 
Work 
Other Labor Market Measures 
Education  
Absenteeism 
Client’s own request 









Sum  100  
 
In sum, clients tend to spend much less time at Källan compared to 
Jobbcentrum as the average program time is 49 days. But the program duration 
analysis include all participants at Källan and it is not disclosed whether social 
assistance clients tend to have longer or shorter times compared to other client 
groups. 21 % of the clients find an employment, but the majority of the clients 
transfer to other type of support systems. Finally, the statistical analysis of both 
Jobbcentrum and Källan is curtailed due to the lack of systematic program data 
but the above analysis offers an indication about programmatic “results”. 
However, the lack of output data is interesting in itself as it highlights the 
limited understanding about municipal activation programs.  
 
 
4  Activation in street-level practice: 
the daily work at Jobbcentrum and 
Källan 
In this section, I will describe and analyze the practical work at 
Jobbcentrum and Källan from a street-level bureaucracy perspective. I will 
discuss how front-line workers implement activation requirement in their daily  
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work. The focus is on how the front-line workers respond to their working 
conditions. Front-line workers adopt coping mechanisms in order to manage 
internal organizational dynamics and constrained work conditions, such as 
ambiguous goals, insufficiently resources, and limited professional skills. In 
effect, they develop informal bureaucratic routines that manage the mismatch 
between capacity and potential demands (Lipsky, 1980; Brodkin, 1997).  
Examples of such routines are how front-line workers rationing services and 
prioritize among clients when resources and their time are limited, how they 
select those who are most likely to succeed in the activation process, how they 
categorize and standardize clients in order to match them to available services 
instead of assessing clients’ individual needs and preferences. They also 
rationalize or provide ad hoc explanations about their decisions afterwards in 
order to justify their decisions. They utilize control and monitoring 
mechanisms as well as sanctions in order to obtain clients’ compliance or to 
check clients’ motivation to become self-supporting and ultimately clients’ 
eligibility to social assistance. Another common street-level method in the 
activation process is to separate the responsibilities of the exercise of public 
authority and formal decisions when program accountability is difficult to 
obtain.   
The above examples of coping behaviors will be used to analyze and 
illustrate how the institutional context shapes the practical implementation of 
activation policy. Hence, the analytic model for this study is how the informal 
coping mechanisms in the daily bureaucratic practices form the practical 
experience of activation policy. From a street-level bureaucracy perspective, it 
is the front-line workers’ responses to the institutional contexts that furnish the 
practical experience of activation policy.  
 
4.1  Referral process: selecting clients to the activation 
programs 
The activation process in both Skärholmen and Osby is initiated with the 
social assistance application. Social workers do the first sorting of the clients 
and determine who will be referred to the activation programs or not. Even 
though the legislation and local politicians probes for an individual assess-
ment, most clients are sorted into the group that must participate in the 
activation program. A social worker in Osby said: 
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It’s supposed to be an individual assessment behind the policy, 
but I’m restrained by the local model … it’s limited room for 
exceptions and the flexibility is small … 
28  
 
In Skärholmen it was described like this:  
 
I select all unemployed clients if they don’t have a doctor’s 
certificate … I don’t do many exceptions … Jobbcentrum works 




Social workers refer clients to the activation program even in situations 
when they are not convinced that it is helpful for the clients. A social worker in 
Osby said: 
 
… she can search for jobs on her own … but this is the local 




It is reasonable that most clients are referred to the program without much 
individual assessments, as social workers must justify exemptions to managers 
or colleagues, and most exemptions undergoing close scrutiny. This process is 
described like this in Skärholmen: 
 
It’s uncomfortable that one must justify every decision about 
every small thing … it’s common that mangers ask … why did 
you pay that, was that necessary and so on… 
31  
 
Exemptions from the activation requirement are not common, as managers 
and directors do not support decisions that deviate from the local administrative 
norms. The director for Skärholmen’s social assistance organization explained 
her view: 
 
It’s different now … it’s not good to live on social assistance and 
we should always have expectations on our clients. It’s always 
                                                      
28 Conversation with social worker in Osby, 2002-12-09 
29 Conversation with social worker in Skärholmen, 2002-12-17 
30 Conversation with social worker in Osby 2003-02-06 
31 Conversation with social worker in Skärholmen, 2003-06-12  
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special cases that social workers advocate for, but these ‘specials’ 
should not be the norm. 
32 
 
When their directors and managers screen the front-line workers, the 
political leaders monitor the organizational leaders. In both Osby and Skär-
holmen, it is a political decision that the social assistance costs shall be 
reduced. In order to control the numbers, directors are monitored in the sense 
that the social assistance caseload should, at least, not increase. On this matter, 
a social worker in Skärholmen said:  
 
… the social welfare committee has set the goals and they are 
monitoring the management, but not on a case level… they are 
only interested in the overall numbers [meaning that politicians 
are less concerned about the unemployment rates or whether 
clients find employment or not but concerned about the costs for 
social assistance, my comment].
33  
 
Whether all clients should be referred to the activation programs is 
ambiguous. Local politicians call for individual assessments and state that it is 
important to lower the social assistance caseload at the same time. The two 
goals are not necessarily contradictory but might create working conditions 
where social workers tend to refer most clients, as this is the most straight-
forward practice for them. A practice that is consistent with the organizational 
ambition and with the managements’ interest in demonstrating to the politicians 
that the social assistance caseload is being contained. But such practice is 
sometimes as at odds with the activation programs’ objectives as they want to 
work with those easiest to find employment for. On this matter, Jobbcentrum’s 
program manager said: 
 
… we need to reduce the cost for social assistance and, then, it’s 
best to send us the easiest clients to find jobs for. It’s hard for us 




In sum, this means that most unemployed social assistance clients must 
participate in Jobbcentrum’s and Källan’s activities. It illustrates that the 
                                                      
32 Interview with program manager in Skärholmen, 2003-06-16 
33 Conversation with social worker in Skärholmen, 2003-06-12 
34 Conversation with program manager at Jobbcentrum, 2003-01-30  
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organizational goals force social workers to re-interpret the formal intention of 
activation that clients should undergo individual assessments before being 
required to participate in a work program. 
 
4.2 Exemptions  from  the activation requirement 
In both Skärholmen and Osby, some social workers are able to make individual 
assessments and exceptions from the activation requirement more often than 
others. But the bureaucratic process is somewhat different in the two 
municipalities. In Skärholmen it is described as a justification process when the 
social workers must convince the management about the deviating decision. A 
social worker said: 
 
One can do exceptions but then you need to have strong 
arguments and be able to justify the decision that gives something 
extra or different to a client. To walk the extra mile for a client is 
more difficult and takes more work.
35  
 
This exemplifies that clients experience different assessments due to the 
social workers’ potentials to cope with management demands. The observa-
tions have indicated that “more experienced”
36 social workers are more likely 
to make individual assessment or exceptions for clients as they are better 
equipped to justify their decisions for the managements. Similar strategies are 
described in Schierenbeck (2003b), where she found that newly hired social 
workers utilized a stricter interpretation of integration policy as a way to 
support their decisions. A strict interpretation means that the social workers do 
not utilize the complete range of discretion that they are granted. In her study, 
most of the social workers agreed that the possibility to justify their decisions is 
crucial in how they are using their discretion. Schierenbeck writes “[a]s a 
layman, one can get the impression that the bureaucratic work for the most part 
is about the art of justifying one’s decisions” (Schierenbeck, 2003b, p 114).  
In Skärholmen and Osby, managers and directors play an important role in 
how the workers are allowed to use their discretion when interpreting the 
legislation, either by close monitoring or by allowing more freedom. Some 
                                                      
35 Conversation with social worker in Skärholmen 2003-06-12 
36 “More experienced,” means a social worker that has been working within the social work field 
for several years and with a professional education. I have received information regarding the 
social workers’ experiences through the fieldwork.  
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social workers have a greater ability to justify exceptions that is different from 
regular practices. From an activation policy perspective, it is clear that clients 
will be affected by the front-line workers’ ability or inability to justify the 
decision about the clients’ individual needs for activation.  
In Osby, the selection of clients and exemptions from the activation 
requirement is less about management control but more about a strong peer 
pressure among the social workers. In Osby, the Uppsala model is used as a 
“working model” in the social assistance administration. This model em-
phasizes close monitoring of the social workers’ decisions and the clients’ job 
search performance. This arrangement fosters practices in which the social 
workers must justify atypical decisions strongly towards each other. On the 
other hand, clients experience an equal legal treatment in Osby as the social 
worker’s decisions rarely deviate from each other. In this type of organization 
it is difficult for social workers to diverge from the local practical norms. A 
social worker describes her experience with the activation requirement at 
Källan like this:  
 
The model is strange sometimes … it has some advantages, but 
it’s not suitable for some clients … it’s good for clients who don’t 
want to work but bad for clients who have barriers to work. It’s 
also good that we know each other cases and that clients receive 
an equal treatment from all of us … but to question [the model], 
as a social worker, the model is very negative and difficult.
37  
 
Hence, it is a strong peer pressure to refer most clients to Källan, which is 
justified by the social workers as either “the local policy” or “the formal 
legislation”.  
The above examples show how front-line workers cope with pressures 
associated with the selection process in which social workers follows the local 
organizational norm rather than consider clients’ individual need of activation. 
The front-line behaviors in both Skärholmen and Osby are understandable from 
a street-level bureaucracy perspective, as the social workers must justify 
deviating decision very thoroughly for either colleagues or directors and 
managers, even though the legislation and local politicians points to the 
importance with individual assessments and decisions.  
 
                                                      
37 Conversation with social worker in Osby, 2002-12-09  
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4.3  Daily routines: who is responsible for activation? 
Most clients are involved in independent job search at Jobbcentrum and Källan, 
and clients should be searching for jobs on their own. This structure implies 
that the daily routines are dependent on clients’ own ability to be active. Hence, 
mush of the responsibility for the activation is left to the clients. The first 
impression when entering Jobbcentrum is that many clients are unoccupied and 
very passive. Clients are drinking coffee, chatting with each other, or reading 
newspapers. When asking the staff at Jobbcentrum why clients are inactive, a 
common reply is: 
 






… sitting here is a function in it self … they see other clients that 
eventually got a job or practical training … they also see that we 
see them and we can’t monitor them if they are sitting at home.
39  
 
When questioning Jobbcentrum’s program manager about their strategy he 
answers: 
 
… the staff should not activate them because it’s up to the clients 
themselves to find a job. If it’s boring to be here it would motivate 
them to find a job faster so that they can leave.
40  
 
Another explanation was: 
 




Källan do provide more activities in addition to job search and clients are 
sometimes performing tasks, such as, study for driving license, complete home-
work, and train their computer skills. But it is still a focus on clients’ own 
                                                      
38 Conversation with job coach, 2003-06-16 
39 Conversation with job coach, 2003-03-14 
40 Observation program manager at Jobbcentrum, 2002-07-01 
41 Interview with program managers in Skärholmen, 2003-06-16  
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motivation to be activated. Occasionally, social workers are critical about this 
strategy and questioning Källan’s usefulness for certain clients. One social 
worker said: 
 
… I don’t think Källan is skills-enhancing for certain clients … 
but these are the rules and I don’t question what they are doing 
there … but be there between 8 am to 4 pm without results, that’s 
the wrong signals from the society too.
42  
 
At the same time, both the staff and politicians in Osby claim that Källan 
should not provide a lot of activities. A staff member at Källan said: 
 




To understand why the staff does not activate clients or why the programs 
do not provide structured activities, one must recognize how the organizational 
structure shapes what front-line staff is able to do in their daily work. In 
Skärholmen, the job coaches at Jobbcentrum serve large amount of clients and 
it is impossible for them to work individually with each client on a daily basis. 
Källan serves fewer clients but resources are still limited in terms of what the 
activation staff really can do in terms of finding jobs or practical training for 
their clients. Thus, the approach in both municipalities is to let the clients help 
themselves and ask for support. If not, the staff argues that clients are not 
interested or motivated enough to become self-supporting. These practical 
responses are rational, as it assists the staff to handle the demand for support. 
Support that not always is available. According to street-level bureaucracy 
theory, it is logical to move the responsibility for what the activation programs 
can do from the staff to the clients. Since, these programs do not control the 
supply of job vacancies and practical training and if clients do not find 
employment it is rational to say that they are not motivated or active enough. 
They have themselves to blame instead of the program. 
 
                                                      
42 Conversation with social worker in Osby, 2003-01-22 
43 Conversation with program staff at Källan, 2003-01-22  
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4.4 Program  accountability 
When the much of the responsibilities are passed on to the clients, what are the 
programs accountable for? It is argued that accountability is difficult to obtain 
when discretion is a regular part of a policy’s practical implementation. In 
other countries, discretion is frequently constrained by performance measures 
that pressure street-level organizations to “make the numbers” and put clients 
into work and move them off the caseload (i.e. funding is dependant on the 
numbers of clients moved from the caseload or retention rates on stable jobs). 
These types of formal accountability measures do not exist in the Swedish 
activation context (although, as noted, there are political pressures to reduce 
social assistance caseloads)
44 and the organizations have more leeway to shift 
responsibility from the bureaucracy to the individual. In fact, the rationale for 
both the management and front-line staff is that activation is largely a matter of 
“self-activation,” dependent on individuals’ motivation and capacity to figure 
out what to do and how to do it. Since it is up to the clients to “help them-
selves”, the staff have a passive role in the sense that they are not required to 
perform any specific tasks. But if activation workers are dissatisfied with what 
clients choose to do, they may report them to the social worker, which may 
result in the loss of their benefits (Thorén & Brodkin, 2003). Hence, clients are 
monitored all time but program staff is rarely held accountable for their actions. 
One component of the activation program in Skärholmen that would appear 
to impose accountability on the program involves the so-called “Job 
Guarantee”. The Job Guarantee means that new clients are given a “job offer” 
within the first five days at Jobbcentrum. However, in practice, the Job 
Guarantee entails that clients will be given the opportunity to apply for jobs, 
not offered a job. The meaning of the Job Guarantee becomes even more 
reductionist, as the opportunity to apply for jobs mainly consists of providing 
clients with printed copies of vacancy advertisement that are found on the PES 
website and other kind of advertisement. Thus, this program component has 
been criticized and questioned by both social workers and clients due to the 
misleading promise that clients actually will get a job. The response to this 
critique was that the name of the Job Guarantee was altered to “Job Focus”. 
However, Job Focus is essentially the same policy as the Job Guarantee.
45 The 
                                                      
44 For example, in Osby the politicians reduced the social assistance funding markedly from one 
year to another. 
45 Information from program manager at Jobbcentrum 2004-08-18  
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practical experience is that job coaches provide clients with ‘offers’, without 
control of the quality of the offer or if the job is realistic for the client. The 
implication of this policy is not to ensure the accountability of the program, 
since it does not deliver the manifest function to guarantee a job in practice. 
Källan do not have a policy similar to the Job Guarantee, but the accountability 
of the program is seldom related to the program itself or to the workers’ 
performances.  
There is no formal strategy to control the accountability of the front-line 
workers in either Skärholmen or Osby. In such situation, where the front-line 
staff performance cannot be controlled (e.g. if they are able to find jobs for 
their clients) and resources that would improve clients’ possibilities to enter the 
labor market are scarce, coping mechanisms such as disclaiming accountability 
is a rational strategy to make their work manageable. 
 
4.5  What kind of support and services are available for 
clients? 
Although much of the responsibility and accountability is passed on to the 
clients, Jobbcentrum and Källan do provide useful services. For example, both 
programs try to have close relations with local employers and companies that 
eventually will hire their clients. Jobbcentrum do occasionally invite employers 
to recruiting sessions. These recruiting sessions are talked about as valuable 
and clients are encouraged to participate. However, it is not clear how many 
clients that actually find an employment through these sessions. During the 
time for the observations, one cleaning company was recruiting at Jobbcentrum 
and a handful of clients were interviewed.
46 But when questioning a job coach 
about the recruiting session later on, I was told: 
 
… it’s terrible, none of the interviewed clients has heard anything 
from the cleaning company. Our clients shouldn’t be treated like 
that they should at least have contacted them … even if they 
didn’t get the job. 
47  
 
Recruiting sessions are viewed as a helpful resource and job coaches are 
still encouraging clients to participate in them even though they have little 
                                                      
46 This was the only recruiting session at Jobbcentrum during the time for the research. 
47 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2003-04-09  
IFAU – Municipal activation policy  42
evidence that it would lead to an employment for the clients. No recruiting 
session took place at Källan but they tried to build a pool of employers who 
could provide both practical training and employment for their clients. This 
effort largely failed, as many local companies were not interested in Källan’s 
clientele at this time due to a slow economy. The program manager at Källan 
describes the situation like this: 
 
It’s difficult to find jobs and practical training slots right now due 
to structural problems in the area. Our idea about a practical 
training pool has not been successful and most local employers 
are telling us that they want to wait until the economy has 
improved before they hire someone or offer practical training … 
48 
 
From a street-level bureaucracy perspective, the practical experience of 
activation becomes what the staff can offer. The street-level logic to offer what 
is available is also present when looking at training and education services. 
Skills and competence upgrading are regularly the means to make unemployed 
individuals more attractive on the labor market. As described earlier, 
Jobbcentrum encourages work as the first alternative and job search are 
promoted prior to education or training. A job coach at Jobbcentrum explained 
that: 
 
… we do not offer or encourage clients to participate in education 
and training as the first alternatives for clients … clients shall find 
a job initially … it’s later on that we suggest training and 




This is an opposite strategy compared to Källan, were the staff encourage 
clients to participate in education and training measures to improve clients’ 
skills and competence. The practices to limit participation in education and 
training services are rationalized in a variety of ways in Skärholmen. For 
example, when questioning program managers and job coaches at 
Jobbcentrum, they maintain that traditional ALMP programs delivered by the 
PES hold back participants’ advancement into the labor market. They also 
                                                      
48 Conversation with program manager at Källan, 2003-02-28 
49 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2002-09-25  
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contend that if clients spend time in ALMP programs, they are not motivated to 
become self-supporting as fast as possible as these programs create lock-in 
effects. Occasionally, clients are able to successfully negotiate for training 
services in Skärholmen. But the probability of success is substantially contin-
gent, in part, on whether those services are readily available. For example, a 
client with poor Swedish skills expressed her interest in vocational training in 
childcare or in a food service company in order to practice her language skills. 
The job coach responded positively and promised to explore available training 
slots. The job coach explains after the meeting that childcare training is rather 
easy to arrange because: 
 
… it’s free labor for the childcare system and they accept clients 
even clients with little language skills and sometimes it actually 
leads to a regular job.
50  
 
This illustrates that exceptions from the ‘work first’ approach are made 
when training slots are available. Furthermore, during a staff meeting at 
Jobbcentrum, information about new and available vocational courses was 
disclosed. The staff was told that they should try to fill as many slots as 
possible with clients from their municipality. Hence, job coaches were 
encouraged to persuade clients to apply for these courses. Afterwards, almost 
every client was suggested to apply for the courses regardless of the client’s 
background or individual interest in the courses. Normally, clients was 
encouraged to apply for jobs, but this time, clients were encouraged to apply 
for the course instead. For example: 
 
Client: I want a job now! 
Job coach: … many other [clients] want to work too … but what 
do you think about a course for retail cashier work? 
Client: Is it good for me? 
Job coach: It’s very good for you and you get practical training 
too. 
Client: I’m good at restaurants and retail jobs …  
Job coach: We have a restaurant assistant course too … very good 




                                                      
50 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2002-10-09 
51 Observation client meeting at Jobbcentrum, 2003-03-14  
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Analytically, the assessments of clients’ need are ‘elastic’, more dependent 
with the logic of street-level work and what the front-line workers can offer, 
instead of clients’ real needs. Such practices can be observed when training 
slots are easier to obtain and clients are then more likely to be recommended as 
‘needing’ training compared to periods when those slots are unavailable.  
 
4.6 Client  categories and matching services 
Social workers also perform a rudimentary sorting, meant to cue the activation 
staff about the clients’ employment prospects and, significantly, the 
motivation of the clients. In Skärholmen, this is made with written forms, in 
which social workers separate clients into different levels based on how the 
social worker view the client’s motivation and capacity to work.
52 These 
assessments are highly discretionary and do not create an automatic sorting of 
services that will be made available for the clients at Jobbcentrum. However, 
they do implicitly signal, to the job coaches, different categories of clients that 
they have more incentives to help (those apparently prepared to take advantage 
of good job opportunities) and others that they have incentives to control 
(those whose supposed lack of motivation makes them suspect as resistance to 
activation, in effect, a client who is a “trouble”). Although the precise re-
lationship between clients’ scores on these assessments and their treatment at 
Jobbcentrum cannot be stated with certainty, but they indicate practical 
consequences of the sorting process (Thorén & Brodkin, 2003).  
In Osby, clients are not sorted in such formal manner, but one can notice 
similar sorting patterns of clients’ motivation and capacity in relation to 
support or control functions. For example, clients who are viewed as un-
motivated and not interested in finding a job are often required to either 
perform internal work at Källan (e.g. carpentry, painting, kitchen etc.) and/or 
have detailed schedules of the activities the client must accomplish. Conse-
quently, informal sorting processes are in place and these practices can be 
viewed as individual adaptations and/or methods to test the eligibility to social 
assistance.  
                                                      
52 On the written form clients are sorted into four different categories depending on their 
motivation and capacity to work. A category = High capacity, high motivation, B category = 
High capacity, no motivation, C category = Low capacity, high motivation, D = Low capacity, 
low motivation.   
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Additionally, observations of the sorting processes suggest that clients are 
divided in to a number of informal categories, which influence clients’ 
experience at the activation programs. These categories are constructions 
developed from observations of the sorting processes and do not constitute 
formal program categories.  
 
  Clients motivated and willing to work: these clients are ‘seriously’ looking for 
jobs and wishes to leave social assistance as soon as possible. They should 
move into a regular job fast and are given multiple job search supports such as 
ads for job vacancies, practical training placements, and job matching 
programs. Alternatively, ‘serious’ clients are left alone to do job search by 
him/her self as it is viewed that these clients are capable to find employment 
independently.  
 
  Clients motivated to work but with little capacity: these clients really want to 
work but have limited abilities such as little Swedish skills, low education 
levels, or other barriers to find a job. Clients in this group are also offered 
various job search support, for example, practical training placement or 
programs with the aim to improve language or other social skills. In Osby, 
many immigrant clients fit this category and they are, in general, in language 
education (SFI). 
 
  Unserious clients without motivation to work: this type of clients is 
‘unserious’ as they have abilities to work, such as, enough language skills and 
competence in application writing, but show no interest in finding 
employment. They can also be suspected for working on the “black labor 
market” The willingness to work will be ‘tested’ by offering the client 
different job ‘offers’. These offers are often in tedious or undesirable jobs like 
jobs in the fast food sector or the “park group”
53 in Skärholmen. In Osby, this 
group of clients is carefully monitored with a tight schedule at Källan and 
various internal tasks to accomplish in order to control their willingness to 
work. This category is rarely offered attractive practical training slots or 
education support.  
 
  Clients temporary excused from participating in activation: these are clients 
with verified health problems, clients on sick-leave with doctor’s verifications, 
clients on parental-leave, or clients close to the retirement age or giving birth 
may be excused from participation in the activation program.  
                                                      
53 The park group does largely maintenance work in public parks and other outdoor spaces. It 
consists mainly of clients with substance abuse or mental health problems, but also for clients 
whose willingness to work needs to be ‘tested.’  
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As these informal categories are not equivalent with formal program 
categories, instead they are responses to organizational dynamics inherent the 
social assistance with its focus on eligibility determination. In practice, the 
clients are informally divided into groups depending on motivation and 
capacity and not their needs of labor market support. Järvinen (2002) describes 
how social workers in Denmark try to investigate clients’ motivation and desire 
to participate in activation measures. If clients refuse to participate they are a 
“bad” clients and their social assistance will be withheld or reduced. Hence, in 
practice the activation requirement becomes a way to control the clients’ 
motives and function therefore as a traditional “work-test”. This is in cor-
relation with the eligibility determination process, which control is a natural 
part of the social assistance system. And when municipal activation measures 
become a part of the social assistance system, control becomes one of the main 
features of activation policies as well. 
 
4.7  Prioritizing clients when resources are limited 
Another form of coping strategy occur when resources needs to be rationed and 
the staff selects clients who either are most easy to help (e.g. less time 
consuming) or those who will leave the program fast (e.g. leave the staff’s 
caseload). Such practices are consistent with creaming, a coping mechanism 
used to portion limited resources to make the situation manageable (see Lipsky, 
1980). The prioritizing among clients due to a high workload is exemplified 
with a comment from a job coach at Jobbcentrum: 
 
So many clients need my help with their applications letter that 
I’m ‘attacked’ in the computer room … and it becomes a 




At Jobbcentrum, job coaches often has caseloads with more than 50–70
55 
clients, makes it almost impossible for job coaches to give clients individual 
attention. At times, Jobbcentrum are closing their intake due to an over-
                                                      
54 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2003-03-10 
55 A caseload of 50–70 clients is probably smaller compared to the staff at the PES, but as 
Jobbcentrum has a goal to provide individual support to a rather demanding population, a such 
large caseload per job coach makes this goal unattainable.  
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whelming workload and meetings with clients are rarely longer than 20 
minutes.
56 Job coaches often confessed that they wished they had more time to 
focus more on individual clients in order to properly help them with the job 
search, and finally, into the labor market. The common procedure is according 
to job coaches:  
 
… to select a handful of clients, to which I can provide more help. 
I pick a handful of clients mostly those that are close to the labor 
market to which I give extra assistance with job applications. 
They will leave Jobbcentrum fairly quickly. I will also pick a few 
‘long-timers’ that I try to find a suitable job or activity for but 
that’s much more difficult.
57 
 
Even the program manager confirmed Jobbcentrum’s limitations to work with 
clients with more barriers and difficulties: 
 
We want to work with the easiest clients … if one wants to reduce 
the social assistance costs, we must work with the clients close to 
the labor market first … 
58 
 
This example illustrate that job coaches only can support a small selection 
of clients individually and they select those clients on the basis of time and 
what support the client requests. Hence, the large caseloads force them ‘cream’ 
among the clients in order to help some. The result is that activation becomes a 
policy in which certain clients are helped, whereas others are left without 
support depending on the workers discretion of who is going to be served. 
Despite this situation, some clients are more able to obtain the front-line 
workers attention and support. For example, one client asked for help with the 
registration at the PES. The job coach made an exception and helped the client 
with the long and complicated registration procedure together with the client. 
The job coach explained that she regularly does not do such things because it is 
too time consuming. But she was willing to support the client this time because 
she thought that the client was “serious” and enthusiastic to work and “nice to 
work with”. The job coach said: 
 
                                                      
56 According to  
57 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2003-06-16 
58 Conversation with program manager Jobbcentrum, 2003-01-30  
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I wish I could do this with more clients but we don’t have the time 
so we need to select a few clients and focus on them.
59  
 
In Osby, prioritizing among clients is not as evident as they serve a smaller 
client group, but some clients receive more attention than others. The selection 
process is not formed as much by time and resources as in Skärholmen, it is 
rather about on front-line workers motivation and willingness to work with 
certain clients. This becomes a function that separates between “good” and 
“bad” clients depending on clients’ behavior instead of their needs.  
The practical response from the front-line workers entails that some clients 
are given extra support and this selection is based on four main factors. 1) time 
– when staff have the time, 2) available services – when the client ask for help 
that the staff actually can provide, 3) clients’ behavior – when clients are 
considered serious and motivated, and 4) clients’ status on the labor market – 
their closeness to the labor market. These bureaucratic practices demonstrate 
that activation programs support clients due to different kinds of creaming.  
 
4.8 Activation  based  on  clients’ behavior  
A “good” client is a common expression among both social workers and 
activation workers and the staff often refer to clients as “serious and motivated 
to find a job”, “I can trust them”, and “they don’t want to cheat us”.
60 The 
observations in Skärholmen and Osby have demonstrated that a good client is a 
client that follows the rules and who show motivation and willingness to both 
work and leave social assistance. Good clients are often those who make the 
work uncomplicated for the front-line staff. Hence, the logic behind this type of 
labeling of clients can based on both the clients’ behaviors as well as the front-
line workers’ own values according to a street-level bureaucracy perspective. 
As discussed above, clients that social workers or activation workers find 
deserving are often given extra support and services and experience less control 
and monitoring. If clients fail to comply with the local activation rules they are 
viewed “unserious” and might receive less support from the activation program 
or their social worker. In one exceptional case, the social worker spends extra 
                                                      
59 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2003-04-09 
60 There are common responses from front-line staff in both Skärholmen and Osby about the 
clients.   
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time with a client conducting hands-on application writing. The social worker 
explains her actions by: 
 
… this is a ‘good’ client because she is motivated to find a job 
and if I give her some extra support she will find a job quickly 
and become self-sufficient … Jobbcentrum has too many clients 
now so they do not have the time with all of them … but this 
client is worth spending some extra time on … she really wants to 
find a job … but I can’t do this with everybody … but this is a 
serious client … 
61  
 
This action point to the fact “good” clients are more likely to get extra 
support. According to a street-level bureaucracy view, front-line workers have 
an incentive to offer additional help to “good” clients, as it is also more 
satisfying. They will probably leave the program more rapidly as well. The 
activation requirement is also often based on front-line workers possibility to 
trust the clients’ intention and motivation to become self-supporting. In one 
situation a young man showed up the social service office in Osby and a social 
worker met him briefly to discuss his case. The client was very hostile toward 
the activation requirement at Källan and the social worker became suspicious 
toward the client. Afterwards, the social worker told me that: 
 
This client was very unpleasant … I didn’t like his attitude toward 
Källan and I will make him go there just because of that.
62  
 
Clients’ individual performance are important factors when staff decide 
what kind of support clients will receive, but these decisions are also dependent 
on front-line workers moral judgment of clients’ behavior and intentions. 
 
4.9  Clients’ scope of negotiating  
What the client should do while attending the activation program is also 
negotiated in the interactions between front-line staff and the clients. In 
addition to the social workers assessments, activation workers conduct 
additional assessments to learn about clients’ specific employment needs. 
Observations at Jobbcentrum has indicated that front-line staff tends to solicit 
                                                      
61 Conversation with social worker in Skärholmen, 2003-02-20 
62 Observation social worker in Osby, 2003-02-10  
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employment related information, but avoid discussions of more complex 
matters that would be difficult to address. They also tend to steer clients into 
job areas, in which vacancies are easy to locate, although they may diverge 
markedly from client interests or skills. At Källan, social workers and 
activation workers collaborates more closely in this process, but it is in this 
interactions that clients’ scope of negotiation are disclosed. Källan’s clients 
have more individual options, but still within the range of activities that the 
program can offer. One major difference between Källan and Jobbcentrum in 
terms of clients, possibilities to influence their participation is that Källan 
encourage clients to take part in programs and activities that are delivered by 
other authorities and organizations. The practices in Osby can be explained by 
a closer collaboration between different authorities, which might be a 
consequence of it being a smaller town or of a different labor market situation.  
At Jobbcentrum, clients are initially asked what Jobbcentrum can do for 
them in order to become self-supporting and what the client is planning for the 
future. A job coach once said:  
 
… the initial meeting is about finding clients a job, we don’t tell 
clients about our education and training possibilities until the 
client has spent some time here at Jobbcentrum … 
63 
 
Another job coach explained: 
 
 … we don’t suggest educations or training in the beginning since 
we want client’s to find a real job first … 
64  
 
The point here is that Jobbcentrum has a “work first” approach and focus 
primarily on work. To have a work first approach is nothing remarkable or 
incorrect but such practices can be problematic if they eliminate clients’ 
negotiation opportunities. Given the goal of a fast movement from social 
assistance, the staff has little incentive to provide information about additional 
resources or explore to the clients’ individual circumstances. But it can be 
questioned as many clients have difficulties to actually find a stable employ-
ment without support that could improve their education and skills. In contrast 
to Jobbcentrum, neither the social workers nor the activation workers in Osby 
                                                      
63 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2002-09-25 
64 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2003-03-14  
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experience the same pressure to put clients into jobs that rapidly and the front-
line staff are normally encouraging clients to participate in different training 
activities. Hence, the clients in Osby are often transferred, when possible, to 
other programs and other benefit schemes (e. g. activation support from the 
PES and introduction support for immigrants).  
Moreover, at Jobbcentrum, clients are also asked a number of standardized 
questions to obtain information about their job goals and to check the clients’ 
interest in finding a job. The use of forms with pre-suggested job areas does 
this work easier but much routinized for the job coaches. One job coach told 
that:  
 
… it’s very hard when clients have very specific job desires, like 
car mechanics, as that makes it very difficult for us to give them 
‘job offers’ to apply for … but it is also hard when clients have 




The forms also cue clients that compliance with the rules provides an 
opportunity to become a “good” client. It can otherwise it be judged that they 
are not to “the disposal to the labor market”. The forms definitely limit the 
scope of negotiation for the clients. For example, one client was afraid that she 
could loose the social assistance if she did not check all boxes on the form. She 
told me that: 
 
I checked all the boxes on the job area form, because you want to 
show that you are active and motivated to search for jobs.
66 
 
Clients’ level of negotiation is much affected of the local and organizational 
context and how the front-line workers respond to these different situations. A 
more difficult labor market situation in Osby gives the staff more incentives to 
refer clients to other authorities and education programs as it is hard to find 
jobs. In Skärholmen, a work first approach is more functional as it is easier to 
find jobs. These strategies are in line with the Social Service Act’s objective 
that clients shall “do what they can to be self-supporting”. On the other hand, 
when front-line staff does not have the means to respond on clients’ requests, 
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front-line staff tries to simplify the activation process to make it manageable. 
Then it is actually disincentive to follow up clients’ own suggestions, which 
diverge from the rationale of respond to clients’ individual employment needs, 
which also is an objective with the legislation and the programs own 
descriptions as well. 
 
4.10  Separation of the exercise of public authority
67  
A common bureaucratic practice in the activation process in Källan and Osby is 
the separation of the responsibility to exercise public authority between social 
workers and activation workers. Both Jobbcentrum and Källan are separated 
from the exercise of public authority and formal decision-making in the social 
assistance process. A result is that activation workers seldom make any formal 
decisions about the clients’ social assistance cases. They just pass on the 
clients’ concerns to the responsible social worker. The separation of public 
authority and formal decision-making between social workers and activation 
workers is also found in other organizations. For example, Carstens (1998) 
discover similar findings in her study of activation measures in Denmark. 
Carstens claims that social workers in Denmark avoid issues that remind both 
the client and the social worker that their relationship is very asymmetric and 
that there is an underlying conflict between the client’s interest and the 
organization’s interest. In her study, the social workers do not want to send out 
messages that their relationship is not a friendly meeting on equal terms. 
Carsten argues that this is to pretend that the social worker is there to support 
the client, even though Carsten maintain that activation is not about clients’ 
long-term employment, it is rather about checking clients’ motivation to 
participate in the activation activities.  
In both Osby and Skärholmen, activation workers present their support as an 
“offer” to the clients even though their services are closely related to the social 
assistance administration. By doing so, the activation workers can hold up an 
image that the services are voluntary and avoid the coercive element of the 
activation requirement. This strategy becomes a coping mechanism for the 
front-line staff when the activation requirement is more a way of determining 
social assistance eligibility rather than providing services that will support 
clients to find an employment. The activation workers want to cover the 
                                                      
67 Myndighetsutövning (my translation).  
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coercive elements in order to keep a good relationship with the clients. Thus, 
the social workers become the formal decision-makers and the “bad guys”, 
while the activation workers can avoid unpleasant decisions that might upset 
clients. Already at the first information meeting about Jobbcentrum, clients are 
informed about this arrangement and they are told; “it’s not the staff at 
Jobbcentrum that decides that you are required to be here, it’s your social 
worker”.
68 The decision-making is also the responsibility for the social workers 
in Osby, and Källan’s staff claims that they are not involved in this process. 
However, the separation of formal decision-making can never be complete 
since the social assistance claim is based on the client’s performance in the 
programs. From a street-level bureaucracy perspective, it is logical to keep 
activation workers neutral, as it becomes an informal method to hide the close 
relationship between the social workers and the activation workers. But it can 
be a fragile arrangement, with tensions between social workers and activation 
workers if their close relationship is disclosed for the client. For example, a 
social worker once told a client that the job coach had reported that the client 
was ‘inactive’ at Jobbcentrum. The client was very upset with the job coach’s 
actions and the job coach told me: 
 
… this is not how it should be … we must be able to work with 
the clients here at Jobbcentrum and we can’t be ‘bad’ in the 
clients’ eyes … the exercise of public authority is the responsi-
bility of the social workers … if it crashes it’s here and we are not 
behind locked doors …[meaning that the job coaches are working 
face-to-face with the clients all the time, my comment]
69  
 
This statement exemplifies that the bureaucratic practices of the separation 
of public authority has an important latent function for front-line staff. Hence, 
by leaving all formal responsibilities to the social workers, the activation 
workers can escape hostile reactions and hold-up an image that their support is 
an “offer”. From a street-level bureaucracy perspective this is a rational 
strategy as the front-line workers can keep a neutral role in the threefold 
relationship between the social worker, the activation worker, and the client. 
But as noted, such arrangement is not free from conflicts as activation and 
social assistance, in practice, are closely related. The separation of public 
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69 Conversation with job coach at Jobbcentrum, 2003-03-14  
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authority becomes a coping strategy for the staff to manage this complex 
arrangement. 
 
4.11 Monitoring  clients’  attendance and performance 
The activation workers and the social workers closely monitor clients’ 
attendance and performance at the activation programs. For example, at 
Jobbcentrum, clients line up every day at the reception desk, both entering and 
leaving the premises in order to register their attendance. This is a time 
consuming activity for clients and some clients have made written card with 
their personal identification number so that they do not need to tell their 
identification number loud two times every day in a crowded corridor. Today, 
Jobbcentrum has upgraded their attendance registration system and clients can 
register themselves through a computer. Källan do not monitor attendance 
through a formal registration process but they keep close records of clients’ 
attendance. Social workers have access to the attendance data in both Osby and 
Skärholmen and the social assistance benefit is based on clients’ attendance 
and performance.  
In addition to the attendance registration system, the schedule at 
Jobbcentrum change every two weeks between a morning and an afternoon 
session in order to control clients’ time allocation. Clients attend the morning 
session (8:00 am to 11:30 am) during one week and the afternoon session 
(12:00 pm to 3:30 pm) the following week. The reason behind this schedule 
change is not to increase clients’ employment opportunities but to make it 
difficult for clients to work in the “black-market economy” according to the 
staff. The schedule switch compels clients to follow a daily schedule and be 
punctual, two traits that are important as an employee also according to the 
staff. Källan do not monitor clients with schedule changes and computerized 
systems, but the staff argues that following a regular schedule is an important 
competence that many social assistance clients need to practice. Especially 
young clients need to get up in the morning and follow a daily routine 
according to the staff in both Osby and Skärholmen. In Osby, the staff is also 
concerned with clients’ passivity and according to a social worker: 
 
Källan is good for negative and lazy clients that are passive … but 
it’s not meaningful for all clients … 
70 
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When reviewing case files in Osby the formal decision regarding the 
activation requirement is often based on statements like: 
 
… “in order to prevent passivity the client is referred to skills-
enhancing activity at Källan.”
71  
 
Hence, monitoring clients’ attendance is a street-level strategy to compel 
clients to show up every day as well as a function to reduce passivity in it self. 
Both social workers and activations workers have said that the clients need the 
attendance requirement in order to induce clients to come as well as stay in the 
programs. The post-hoc rationalizations at the staff level are that clients need 
this monitoring as an incentive to leave passivity and marginalization by 
having a structured day. However, there is no systematic knowledge whether a 
structured day and attendance requirements improve clients’ possibilities to 
find employment. These control mechanisms can also be scrutinized from the 
perspective of the official rhetoric about the main principles of activation 
programs. The main principles is often said to be a focus on clients’ resources 
and not on their limitations and the message from politicians, the staff, and 
program documents is that all clients as capable and resourceful individuals 
that can be self-sufficient. According to the program managers at Jobbcentrum: 
 
… we believe that clients has resources themselves and that they 




With such philosophy it sounds rather contradictory that clients, in practice, 
need to be monitored and controlled carefully. Viewed from the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective the control system becomes an important tool to 
monitor clients’ eligibility to social assistance, which an important element of 
the social assistance administration, rather than a method of improve clients’ 
possibilities to enter the labor market. 
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4.12  The use of sanctions in activation programs 
Sanctions are a legal strategy when clients do not comply with the rules and 
they are not entitled to social assistance anymore. But in the street-level 
practice, it can also be used as an informal function in the practical delivery of 
social assistance and the activation requirements. For example, in practice 
sanctions can be used as a gate-keeping function in times of high workloads as 
it will result in fewer clients to serve (Lipsky, 1980, Brodkin 1997). It can also 
be used a method to control clients’ motivation to work or if they have other 
alternatives than social assistance to become financially independent. Sanctions 
or threats of sanctions can also be used as a method to make clients comply 
with the rules and to collaborate with the front-line worker.  
In this study, it has been revealed that sanctions or the threats of sanctions 
are utilized for many reasons and in different situations in both Skärholmen and 
Osby. According to administrative data, Skärholmen is the city-council in 
Stockholm City that has most declined social assistance claims.
73 To decline an 
application is sometimes used as a strategy to make clients appeal the decision 
in court, which then will provide a principal decision for that particular 
situation. However, it is known that social assistance clients seldom appeal to 
court and that the social services often are better prepared in such legal 
disputes. In Osby, sanctions are also a part of the social assistance ad-
ministration and it is often an encouraged method by the management. 
According to the social assistance manager: 
 
We use sanctions for clients who don’t fulfill the requirement, the 
whole family can loose the benefit if one parent don’t comply 
with the activation requirement … it is a ‘gate-keeper’ and we 
have declined or reduced the social assistance several times.
74 
 
The management in both Osby and Skärholmen are positive to the use of 
sanctions in the administrative process and a practical consequence is that 
sanctioning is a widespread tool among the front-line staff. One example is that 
sanctions are often used to control the motivation of clients. A social worker 
told me that she had declined the social application for a client who was not 
‘active’ enough and she said about: 
                                                      
73 Statistics Stockholm 2002-2004 
74 Conversation with the social assistance manager in Osby, 2002-08-15  
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The sanctioning made the client change her attitude … and the 
client does now understand what this is about and she is now 
searching for jobs more actively … 
75 
 
In other words, clients can be sanctioned in order to change their behavior 
or comply with the rules. At Jobbcentrum, for example, a client can be offered 
to participate in the park group or the dog park, and if the client refuses, the 
social worker is informed, and the client will most likely experience a total loss 
or a reduction of the social assistance, based on the social workers’ discretion. 
The reason, and the social worker’s rationalization, behind the sanction is that 
the client is categorized as not “to the disposal to the labor market” if declining 
such proposal. Another client lost social assistance when his job coach judged 
that he was not sufficiently pursuing his job search and it was reported to the 
social worker. The job coach explained that:  
 
He was sanctioned because he didn’t apply for any jobs, he was 
just talking and was drinking coffee at Jobbcentrum. He hasn’t 




This client was cut off due to inactivity, which is not in conflict with the 
rules in the Social Service Act. On the other hand the staff at Jobbcentrum has 
also claimed that sitting unoccupied is a function in itself as it makes clients 
motivated to leave Jobbcentrum. In this perspective, it is rather ambiguous that 
clients occasionally can be sanctioned when being inactive according to the 
staff. Since the sanctions are based on the front-line workers’ discretion, it 
becomes interesting to ask: when are clients cut off and under what 
circumstances? For example, when is it not enough to attend Jobbcentrum on a 
daily basis day and which clients need to do more in order to fulfill the local 
rules? 
In Skärholmen job coaches and social workers meet regularly to review 
their joint clients. In a client review session, a job coach and an administrative 
assistant talked about a client: 
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Job coach: It’s impossible to work with her … I offered her to 
apply for the retail course but she declined … we should set up a 
three-part meeting to check her intentions. 
Social worker: She should be sanctioned if she refuses to go … 
Job coach: Yes, that’s a clear signal for her … but you must do it 
because we have no money to threat with. [In this case the staff 
wants to control the client’s behavior by using the threat of 
rejecting the social assistance claim, (e.g. if you don’t go to this 
course you will loose your benefit). But since the job coach does 
not have the authority to decide about the economic situation, the 
job coach wants the social worker to do it in practice.]
77 
 
Here, the staff is discussing how they can use the threat of sanctions by 
reducing the social assistance in order to change the clients’ behavior. The job 
coach wants to social worker to execute the threat, as the staff at Jobbcentrum 
does not have control of the financial means to do it. However, sanctions must 
be justified in the clients’ formal decisions. In one case in Osby, the social 
workers were concerned about a client’s intention to participate in the acti-
vation program. They discussed the case and how to rationalize decision about 
rejecting the client’s social assistance. The social workers had the following 
conversation about the case: 
 
If we refuse to give him social assistance, we must justify the 
decision … not only because of the social worker’s vacation … 
but he was asked to turn in some additional documents too …and 
his attendance in not so good … we can refuse social assistance if 
we can ‘bend’ the decision as an activation referral according to 
Social Service Act § 4:4 …
78 
 
Regularly, § 4:1 in the Social Service was used when clients was required to 
attend Källan, but in this case, the response was to twist the decision 
formulation in order to fit their practical actions. This exemplifies that front-
line worker use their discretion when interpreting the legislation so that their 
practical use of sanction will correspond with the policy’s formal obligations. 
This example speaks also to the fact that the legislation is unclear about the 
conditions under which activation can be required as well as sanctioned.  
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The use of sanctions is a normal part of the social assistance administration 
when clients are not entitled the support and should be used when clients fail to 
comply with the rules in the legislation. But it is a risk that the practical use of 
sanctions or threat of sanctions becomes a tool based on the front-line workers 
own values instead of the clients’ behavior and compliance with the rules. For 
example, a client in Skärholmen was considered “strange” and “mysterious” by 
the job coach and the social worker and the staff was therefore discussing if a 
sanction or a three-part meeting would the best method to deal with the client.
79 
This exemplifies that the use of sanction can be used as an informal strategy 
when clients do not fit with the programs. Another example demonstrate that 
clients who are viewed as unmotivated are more likely to be reported to the 
social workers as inactive. One social worker said:  
 
Sanctions are my only method to control what the client really 
wants and is motivated for. I often reject the social assistance 
application but I’m willing to change my decisions if the clients 
show motivation to find a job.
80 
 
The possibility of being sanctioned makes clients to behave in ways that 
will reduce the risk of loosing the social assistance. For example, clients are 
afraid to be sanctioned and some clients pretend that they are looking for jobs 
in order to look active even though they have no more vacancies to apply.
81 
Another purpose with sanctions is a gate-keeping function, which is a proper 
method if it prevents a misuse of the policy. But if sanctions in various forms 
are used discourage clients that are entitled to social assistance to apply for the 
support, it is not in line with the legislations intention. 
 
4.13  Summary: the practical implementation of activation 
policy 
In this study, I have directed the analytic attention to the informal bureaucratic 
practices of activation policy. With the street-level bureaucracy perspective as 
the analytic framework, it has been disclosed how different coping behaviors 
add up to the organizational response of municipal activation policy. The 
fieldwork in Osby and Skärholmen has demonstrated that the front-line 
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workers sometimes follow a street-level bureaucracy rationale when translating 
municipal activation policy into practice. For example: 
  Clients are selected to the activation programs based on the pressure to 
refer all clients because exemptions are difficult to get approved.  
  The concrete support that clients are given is often based on front-line 
workers’ time or clients’ deservingness and not always in relation to 
clients’ needs.  
  Control and monitoring of clients is used to make clients to comply 
with the rules or to check clients’ motivation to become self-
supporting. Different kind of ”offers” is also given to the clients in 
order to control their willingness to work. 
  If clients fail to find employment, front-line workers are passing on 
the responsibility to the clients (i.e. they are not motivated enough).  
  Program accountability is nearly unknown, as the programs have no 
responsibilities to provide substantial measures of support and it is up 
to the clients to ‘help themselves’.  
  Sanctions or the threat of sanctions are sometimes latent functions to 
change clients’ behaviors and a gate-keeping function to control the 
demand of support.  
The above practices are typical street-level bureaucracy behaviors and they 
demonstrate that front-line workers are doing what they are able to do 
considering their demanding working situation. The institutional contexts that 
they are working within, are marked with ambiguous goals and limited 
recourses. With such organizational capacity, they follow the rule of least 
resistance and they are doing what is practically feasible when delivering 
municipal activation policy. However, these practical responses add up to 
activation-in-practice, which sometimes diverge from both the intentions in the 
Social Service Acts as well as the programs’ own goals and descriptions.  
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
The development of municipal activation programs in Sweden was a response 
to the increasing social assistance costs in the 1990s. It was also a reaction in 
the municipalities that many unemployed social assistance recipients did not 
receive much support from the traditional ALMP system delivered by the PES. 
Simultaneously, politicians, policy makers, and the public changed their  
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attitudes, in the sense that individuals should more strongly be required to do 
something in return for social assistance. A similar trend has been seen in most 
western welfare states during the last decades as many EU countries and the 
U.S. have developed policies with the goal of activating unemployed citizens. 
However, it is debated whether the activation approach has the capacity or the 
intention to reduce unemployment and combat social exclusion.  
In this study, it is demonstrated that the value of activation policy must be 
understood in relation to its implementation practices. Analytically, the study 
has drawn the attention to the importance of front-line workers’ discretion and 
the practical work at the ground. By examining the multifaceted relationship 
between the legislation, the organizational context, and the practical work one 
begins to understand how the practical implementation of activation policy 
translates into the real experience for the clients. The practical work is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the formal legislation, but ambiguities are shown 
in relation to the legislator’s intentions and the programs’ own official goals. 
The findings presented here suggest that the implementation processes in 
Skärholmen and Osby often signify practices that select clients without much 
individual assessments, clients are controlled with mandatory offers, and 
support is based on the availability of resources instead of individual needs. 
Program accountability is negligible and the responsibility for the activation 
process and its result is transferred from the staff to the clients, as front-line 
workers’ performance rarely is monitored. Another problem with the activation 
requirements is that clients are in general “involuntary”, meaning that they 
have no other means to support for themselves. They can therefore not hold the 
municipalities accountable for the content or the quality of the services they 
receive. It is almost impossible within the legal framework for clients to appeal 
against the activation requirement. If clients try to reject or negotiate the 
content of the activation requirement, they are considered uncooperative and 
can easily lose their social assistance benefit. 
Many activation requirements have similarities with old forms of the “work 
test” used to separate deserving from undeserving clients (Johansson, 2001; 
Lindquist & Marklund, 1995). Despite such resemblance, I argue that it is not 
accurate to say that activation practices today are unimportant or unhelpful. 
The programs, occasionally, provide valuable support in the transition from 
social assistance to regular work. But the programs’ limited capacity in terms 
of time and resources, limited access to practical training and education, and 
few real employment opportunities shape the practical work with the clients. It  
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seems that activation can be meaningful for certain client groups, especially for 
those with rather strong ties to the labor market. My impression is that this 
group of clients finds job listings, computers, phones, and printers as useful 
tools in the job search process. On the other hand, many clients in this 
particular group are capable to search for jobs on their own or through the PES. 
It is rather common with a negative attitude towards services and programs 
delivered by the PES, and in Skärholmen, many clients are not encouraged to 
participate in programs other than Jobbcentrum. I find this attitude problematic 
as it is stipulated in the Social Service Act that social assistance recipients must 
be registered at the PES and that the social assistance administration should 
collaborate with the PES. In Skärholmen, the practical response to the 
collaboration with the PES was, for the most part, that client’s “individual 
action plan” from the PES was copied and put it the client’s case file without 
further considerations. In Osby, the staff collaborated much closer with the 
PES and the attitude was in general that other programs and schooling was 
something positive, but unemployed social assistance clients were most often 
referred to Källan as the first alternative.  
The observations have demonstrated that most unemployed social assistance 
clients are referred to these programs without much individual assessment. A 
finding that suggests that Osby’s and Skärholmen’s activation models 
symbolizes an “one size – fits all” approach in which clients are required to 
participate without much thought of the clients’ individual need of the 
programs. Staff in both Skärholmen and Osby noted that they have difficulties 
serving certain clients, especially those with many barriers to enter the labor 
market or other social difficulties. I find this notable since the municipal social 
services are supposed to serve the client groups that are most marginalized and 
those who cannot find support from other sources in the Swedish welfare 
system. Such finding, make me question, who should be served and with what 
kind of support within municipal social assistance system? When municipal 
activation policy is a component of the social assistance bureaucracy it will 
easily employ features embedded in the social assistance logic, which have a 
practical meaning different from some of the intentions and goals with 
requirements intended to improve clients’ employability.  
As seen in this study, the practical work is also politically and 
organizationally embedded and one must understand the link between the 
implementing organization and the wider social political context. It was 
reasonable that municipalities started to provide programs for unemployed  
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social assistance recipients, when the social assistance costs increased 
dramatically in the 1990s. But as the organizational goal often is to reduce the 
social assistance caseloads, I believe that the practical work easily start to 
diverge from the policy’s formal objective of placing clients in stable jobs. I 
argue that municipal activation policy, as exemplified by Jobbcentrum’s and 
Källan’s strategies, not always provide clients with adequate work-related 
services as they follow a logic that is in line with the social assistance 
administration. In practice, much of the work is about simplifying complex 
tasks, monitoring clients, and disclaiming responsibility. Another important 
part of the social assistance administration is to keep the social assistance costs 
down. This is an important goal, but different, in relation to supporting clients 
on their way from social assistance dependency to self-sufficiency. Both 
municipalities in this study reduced their social assistance cost during the time 
for my fieldwork, but it is still unknown if (and if so, what part of) the 
activation programs have contributed to the reduction. Most municipalities 
reduced their social assistance cost in the early 2000s, with or without 
articulated activation policies. Currently, municipalities are seldom held 
accountable for the outcome of the activation programs and clients cannot 
reject participation in programs as a method to claim program accountability. 
Such institutional context creates practices that merely monitor clients’ time 
allocation and control possible cheaters.  
The most important lesson to draw from this study is that activation policy 
becomes nothing else than the organizational capacity is allowing. The real and 
practical content of municipal activation policy is negotiated and executed in 
the daily interactions between the front-line staff and the clients. Front-line 
workers capability to deliver high-quality support depends on access to useful 
services, such as training and education, their professional skills to manage 
clients’ employment and social needs, and the access to real jobs. I want to 
stress that front-line workers do provide valuable services to clients, but such 
support is not always based on the needs or interests of the clients. Such help is 
often provided when it is available and when it does not significantly violate 
the logic of the social assistance administration. Consequently, municipal 
activation policy in its practical form will not necessarily improve clients’ 
prospects to find employment since its primary function rather is as a method 
to control clients’ entitlement to social assistance.  
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Appendix A 
 
Social Service Act: SFS 2001:453 
 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
 
Chapter 4. Entitlement to assistance 
 
Section 1 
Persons unable to provide for their needs or to obtain provision for them in any 
other way are entitled to assistance from the social welfare committee towards 
their livelihood (livelihood support) and for their living in general. 
  Through the assistance, the individual shall be assured of a reasonable 
standard of living. The assistance shall be designed in such a way as to 
strengthen his or her resources for independent living. 
 
Section 2 
The social welfare committee may furnish assistance beyond what is provided 
in Section 1, if there is cause for so doing. 
 
Section 3 
Livelihood support is provided for reasonable expenditure on  
  1. food, clothing and footwear, play and leisure, disposable articles, health 
and hygiene, a daily newspaper, a telephone and a television licence fee,  
  2. housing, domestic electricity supply, journeys to and from work, 
household insurance and membership of a trade union and an unemployment 
insurance fund. 
  Reasonable expenditure referred to in point 1 of the foregoing shall, as more 
exactly prescribed by the Government, be computed according to a norm 
applying to the whole country (the national norm), on the basis of official price 
surveys regarding basic consumption in various types of household. The social 
welfare committee shall, however, compute this expenditure at a higher level if, 
in a particular case, there is special reason for doing so. The committee may 
also, in a particular case, compute the expenditure at a lower level if there is 
special reason for doing so. 
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Section 4 
The social welfare committee may require a person receiving livelihood 
support for a certain time to take part in work experience or other skill-
enhancing activity to which he is referred by the committee, if it has not been 
possible to provide a suitable labour market policy programme for the 
individual and  
  1. he is under 25 years of age, or 
  2. he is aged 25 or over but, for special reasons, is in need of skill-enhancing 
measures, or 
  3. is engaged in a training programme for which special financial 
arrangements are available but is in need of livelihood support during an 
intermission in the studies. 
  Work experience or skill-enhancing activity as aforesaid shall have the 
purpose of developing the possibilities for the individual to be self-supporting 
in future. The activity shall strengthen the possibilities of the individual 
entering the labour market or, where appropriate, further training. It shall be 
framed with reasonable consideration for the personal preferences and 
aptitudes of the individual concerned. 
  Before making a decision as provided in subsection one, the social welfare 
committee shall consult the county labour board. 
 
Section 5 
If the individual declines, without acceptable cause, to participate in work 
experience or other skill-enhancing activity to which he has been referred as 
indicated in Section 4, further livelihood support may be refused or reduced. 
The same applies if he absents himself, without acceptable reason, from the 
work experience or the skill-enhancing activity. 
 
Section 6 
A person taking part in work experience or other skill-enhancing activity as 
referred to in Section 4 shall not for such purposes be deemed an employee. 
Insofar as the individual performs tasks agreeing with or similar in nature to 
those usually performed in gainful employment he shall, however, be equated 
with an employee for the purposes of Chap. 2, Sections 1–9, Chap. 3, Sections 
1–4 and Sections 7–14, Chap. 4, Sections 1–4 and Sections 8–10 and Chaps. 7–
9 of the Work Environment Act (1977:1160) and the Work Injuries Insurance 
Act (1976:380). Publication series published by the Institute for Labour 
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